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ABSTRACT 
Institutions and Development: Evidence from Vietnam 
by 
Nguyen Nguyen 
The dissertation is composed of three papers on institutions and development, 
with special focus on Vietnam. The first paper, "Club Good and Contract Enforcement," 
investigates the contract enforcement power of the communities whose members 
participate voluntarily. By investing in club goods, communities can use the power to 
exclude members from such club goods as a threat against potential violations of 
contracts and property rights. More club goods lead to stronger contract enforcement, 
which in turn encourages more investment that generates higher income and higher 
contribution to club goods. The optimal level of club-good spending absent perfect 
enforcement is higher than that with perfect enforcement. Even the weakest form of 
coordination in club good provision, the voluntary contribution, can create certain level 
of enforcement. 
The first part of the second paper, "Can Religion Mitigate Credit Rationing: 
Evidence from Vietnam," presents a game-theoretical model of credit rationing. The 
model shows that increasing enforcement always mitigates credit rationing, and thus 
increases equilibrium loan size and interest rate. The second part argues that religious 
affiliation at both household and community levels increases contract enforcement. 
Therefore, in case of credit rationing, religious households, by paying higher interest rate, 
would be able to borrow more than non-religious households. An empirical model to test 
this hypothesis is constructed and applied to the Vietnam Living Standard Survey 1988 
(VLSS 1988) dataset. Religious affiliation at village level is found to reduce default rate, 
and to increase loan value and interest rate significantly. To a lesser extent, household 
affiliation with Buddhism also increases loan size and interest rate. 
The third paper, "Identifying Corruption: Local Officials and the Distribution of 
Disaster Relief in Vietnam," establishes an evidence of corruption of Vietnamese 
commune officials. The dataset is also compiled from VLSS 1998. The paper exploits 
unintended household information of the officials who answered the commune survey to 
trace their household-spending patterns. By connecting the data on the disasters and 
government's aids with the household spending data, we show that there is a significant 
distortion in the distribution of the government's natural relief aids toward the households 
of the local officials. 
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Chapter 1 
Club Good and Community Enforcement 
1.1 Introduction 
Although contract enforcement is a prerequisite to the functioning of the market, it 
was taken for granted throughout most of the history of economic theory. In the 
last two decades, the topic started to draw great attention of economists from many 
subfields: game theory, industrial organization, institutional economics, economics 
of law, international trade, development economics, economic history, and macro 
finance1. 
Economists discovered that in many cases, the formal contract enforcement via 
court system is to be supplemented by various informal contract enforcement mech-
anisms (as in repeated credit sale), or of a secondary role (as in stock trading, in 
inter-bank lending or diamond trading), or simply missing (as in long-distance trad-
1
 While waiting for a long-overdue literature survey, we can only give some well-known examples 
from a few subfields: in game theory see, for example, Alison (1984); in international trade, see Dixit 
(2003); in development economics, see Woodruff (1998); economic history, see Greif (1995) and in 
macro finance, see Kyiotaki (1995). 
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ing or in informal credit markets in developing countries). The limited power of 
formal contract enforcement hinders the capital flows and economic transactions, and 
magnifies market failures (for example, deepening business cycles, as suggested in 
Kyiotaki 1995). 
Economic actors have developed several informal mechanisms to overcome the 
limited nature of formal enforcement. The most obvious mechanism is enforcing 
through repeated transactions: the contract is self-enforcing if the long-term gains 
from the repeated contracts in the future outweigh the short-term gain from breaching 
the present contract2. However, most modern economic interactions are not limited 
to a small number of partners with repeated transactions and thus require other 
forms of enforcement. A more widely applicable mechanism is through "reputation 
effect," in which economic actors can establish and benefit from the reputation of 
being honest within a business community with repeated transactions (for a vivid 
example among Middle-Age Maghribis long-distance traders, see Greif, 1995). A 
relatively new approach in economics suggests that social trust, when incorporates to 
the preference of the economic actors, can create certain level of enforcement. 
In this chapter, we focus on another mechanism of informal contract enforcement, 
namely, enforcement based on club goods. Motivated by the unique role of the tra-
ditional Vietnamese communes in enforcing everyday economic and social activities, 
we raise the following questions: Can a community whose membership is voluntary 
enforce the contracts among its members? What would be the optimal club-good 
2See Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) for a review of the so-called "folk theorems" on repeated 
contracts. 
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provision rule, taking into account the enforcement effect? What is the limit of such 
power? Can voluntary contribution to club good enforce contracts? How does the 
enforcement affect the welfare of the community members? 
To address these questions, we will present a game-theoretical model of the com-
munity enforcement of the lending contracts between its members. We will show that 
by investing in club goods (e.g., excludable public goods), communities can use the 
power to exclude members from such club goods as a threat against potential contract 
violations. Such limited community enforcement will determine how much its mem-
bers could invest in high-return, high-default-risk businesses. More club goods lead to 
stronger contract enforcement, which in turn encourages more investment, which gen-
erates higher income and higher contribution to club goods. In some circumstances, 
there are multiple equilibria according to which some communities with more efficient 
provision of club goods thrive while others are trapped in low equilibrium. 
We will derive the optimal club-good contribution rule, taking into account the 
enforcement effect. We will show that the optimal level of club-good spending absent 
perfect enforcement is higher than the optimal level with perfect enforcement. We 
will also show that due to non-rivalry nature of the club good, even the weakest form 
of coordination in club-good provision, namely, the voluntary contribution, can create 
some level of enforcement. 
Although club good as a mean of contract enforcement has not been discussed in 
detail, it was suggested elsewhere (Richman, 2006). In his paper, Richman presents a 
case study of how the community of Jewish diamond merchants in New York enforces 
credit sale of diamonds among its members and thus secures a long-time monopoly in 
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the industry. Although the paper does not address formally the limitation, optimality 
and efficiency of enforcement mechanism based on community club good, it does 
suggest that such mechanism plays an important role in the case of the New York 
Jewish diamond merchants. The paper, therefore, is one of the most relevant case 
studies that motivate our theoretical model. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the 
unique role of ancient Vietnamese communes in enforcing social and economic trans-
actions as the motivation for our model and manifestation of the model in reality. 
Section 1.3 presents the setting of a three-stage game between the lenders and bor-
rowers within a community. Section 1.4 analyzes the existence and the properties 
of the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the game, the limit of community en-
forcement and the conditions under which the phenomenon of multi-equilibria arises. 
Section 1.5 shows that to find the optimal club-good contribution rules, we can focus 
on a smaller class of rules, namely, the linear income taxes. It also shows that taking 
into account the enforcement effect, the optimal contribution rule imposes higher level 
of club-good contribution and consumption than the efficient level with perfect en-
forcement. Section 1.6 demonstrates that even the weakest contribution rule, namely, 
voluntary contribution, can generate certain level of contract enforcement. 
1.2 Enforcement in Ancient Vietnamese Communes 
In ancient Vietnam, the central government largely limited its role to collecting taxes 
and providing large-scale public projects and national defense, leaving the manage-
5 
ment of everyday life to communes. The communes provided most of the local public 
goods such as clean water, village roads, local security, commune common house and 
commune-specific festivals. They also enforced most of economic relations. According 
to Fforde and Paine (1987), the basic framework of pre-modern Vietnamese society 
is "a fundamentally dualistic and hierarchical social organization articulating central-
ized state and local village". They also emphasized the durability of the Vietnamese 
communes despite the social upheavals. Wrote Fforde and Pain: 
" Some communes in the Red River Delta seem to have histories going back 
to the first millennium. This long-run durability suggests that interaction 
between changes in methods of production and the evolution of its social 
institutions had led to their general suitability in the face of violent social 
change, so long as that change did not take the form of a sharp alteration 
in the attitude of the state." 
The communes remain largely intact, despite the fact that Vietnam has been at-
tacked and invaded dozens of times by the Chinese, Mongols, Champa and Thai; 
occupied for nearly a thousand years by the Chinese and more than seventy years by 
the French; divided by more than two hundred years of civil wars. This extreme dura-
bility implies that the communes must have had effective enforcement mechanisms to 
enforce contract and property rights among their members. 
Commune codes are the most concrete evidence of the informal enforcement mech-
anism in Vietnamese communes. As of 1991, out of 12000 villages in Vietnam, more 
than 5000 village codes had been collected by Institute of Social Science Information 
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of Vietnam. In addition, the legitimacy of these commune codes had been recog-
nized by various central governments. For example, at the end of the 14th century, 
Vietnamese feudist government issued a decree recognizing village codes. In the 19th 
century, French colonial authorities also recognized the legitimacy of village codes 
and attempted to modify them to augment their own regulations in Vietnam. 
However, the contract and property-right enforcement provided by community is 
limited. The most severe punishment the community can apply to its members is 
to exclude a violator from the community (i.e., from consuming community public 
goods). For example, according to Phan Dai Doan and Bui Xuan Dinh (2000), in 
regions of Kinh (the major ethnic of Vietnam), commune codes provide different levels 
of punishment: 
(i) fine, compensate the damages; (ii) beat by stick [...]; (iii) dismiss from 
current social position temporarily or permanently; (iv) boycott the of-
fender from community activities (both in the village scale and in each 
organization that he/she participates in). In serious cases, the village will 
boycott violator's funeral; (v) expel from the village. 
In our theoretical model, we suggest that the optimal spending in community's 
club goods taking into account enforcement effect should be higher than in the case 
of perfect enforcement. This observation may explain the apparently paradoxical ex-
istence of costly religious activities and festivals, debt-financed life-cycle ceremonies, 
extravagant commune common houses, churches and pagodas in relatively poor com-
munes. Many decrees issued by Vietnamese kings demanding lower spending in such 
7 
costly club goods can be considered as indirect evidence of the seemingly overspending 
on the community club goods. 
Phan Dai Doan and Bui Xuan Dinh (2000) concluded that 
In Vietnam, huong uoc or village codes are an autochthonous creation, 
developing from the "codes of precedents" that were oral regulations con-
cerning village borders, public safety, and social interactions in commu-
nities [...]. The development of huong uoc links to that of the village 
community; that is to say, huong uoc is the product of village culture, a 
natural outcome of an imminent development process. They became a 
tool to manage village social relationships, a form of folk knowledge for 
community management. 
1.3 Model Setting 
1.3.1 Agents 
Consider the set N comprised of n female Lenders and n male Borrowers3. Each 
Lender is endowed with one unit of capital. Each Borrowers is endowed with one unit 
of labor, which can be used in traditional production A or/and the capitalist produc-
tion B. Technology A transforms one unit of labor into one unit of income and does 
3In the model, we adopt a particular contract form, namely, the lending contract, for the ease of 
labeling the parties and the actions involved. The payoff specification in our model is not limited to 
lending contracts but is applicable to many other forms of contracts and economic cooperation. Some 
of the more typical examples are crop-sharing contracts between landowners and workers, credit sales 
among the merchants and investment contracts between local investors and entrepreneurs. 
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not require capital. Technology B is capital intensive, requires both labor and capi-
tal and generates higher output, which is determined by the function min{2/3A;, 2/31}, 
where /3 > 1. 
Additionally, agents have identical preferences, which can be represented as an 
additive separable utility function U(gi,Xi) = V\{gi) + V2(xi), in which Xi is the money 
spent on the private good, and (ft is the money spent on the club good. Assume that 
Vi and V2 are both positive, strictly increasing and concave. 
1.3.2 Timeline 
In stage 1, agents randomly match pairwise. Each pair is comprised of a Lender and 
a Borrower. Each Lender i determines the amount fa he lends to Borrower i. 
In stage 2, Borrowers observe the loan profile K. Each Borrower i then chooses to 
either (1) spend the share U = fa of his labor on project B and the rest on project A, or 
(2) default and take away the loan and spend his labor on the traditional technology. 
If Borrower i does not default on the loan ki, then by the end of stage 2, Lender 
i and Borrower i each gets j3ki, the equal share of the output. Borrower i's income is 
equal to Lender i's income, which is 1 + (j3 — l)ki. 
If Borrower i defaults on the loan and spends his labor in project A, then his 
income is 1 + ki, while Lender i's income is 1 — fa. For notational convenience, we 
assume that Borrower i chooses not to default when fc, = 0. The following table 
summarizes the incomes of Lender i and Borrower i in the two scenarios: 
9 
Borrower i 
Lender i 
Not Default 
l + G9--l)fe 
l + G0-l)fci 
Default 
1 + ki 
i-h 
In stage 3, the community observes the offenders in stage 2 and excludes them. 
Each member contributes to the club good according to a pre-specified contribution 
rule. (We will discuss the assumptions on the contribution rules in subsection 2.4). 
Each excluded Borrower spends all of his income on private good. 
1.3.3 Notations 
We distinguish two different scenarios by superscripts D and ND, where D means the 
contract is defaulted on, while ND means the loan contract is not defaulted on. We 
denote a particular contract by subscript i, i e {1,2,..., n}. We use a second subscript 
to distinguish the counterparts of the contract, where B indicates Borrower, and L 
indicates Lender. For example, w^f and U^f are the income and the utility of the 
Borrower in contract i that is not defaulted on. 
Let K = (hi, tc2,..., kn) be the vector of all the loans that Lenders make in Stage 
1. When we focus on loan i, we will write (ki, K-i). 
Let U be the reaction function of Borrower i given the loan profile K, 
{ 1 if i does not default on the loan ki, 0 if i defaults on the loan ki. 
Let i" = {Ii(ki, K-i)} be the vector of Borrowers' choices in Stage 2. Let u = 
10 
(wi,W2, •••,W2n) be the vector of incomes of all agents (community members and 
non-members). When we focus on agent i, we will write u as (wi,U-i), where w_j is 
the incomes of all agents other than i. 
Let M (M C N) denote the set of all community members (M does not include 
defaulted Borrowers). Let WM be the vector of the incomes of these members. When 
we focus on member i, we will write WM as (wi, W^), where W.^ is the incomes of 
all members other than i. 
1.3.4 Contribution Rule 
Let g(W) = {g%(wi, W-i)}ieM be the contribution rule that determines the contribu-
tion of all members to the club good given income profile of all community members. 
gi(W) maps from [0,/3]M to [0,/3] and is continuous in Wi and W_j. 
Assume that the contribution rule has the following properties: 
(i) The contributions is independent of the name of the agents. Mathematically, 
g(WM) = g(WM ) if WM is the profile of the members' incomes resulted from chang-
ing the names of the members in the profile WM. 
(ii) Individual contribution & is weakly monotone increasing in z's income and 
decreasing in others' income. Mathematically, ^ > 0, ^ - < 1 and ^^ < 0 for 
j 7^  i, in which ^^- denotes the change in #, that corresponds to a small increase 
in Wj. The second inequality indicates that when an agent's income increases, his 
disposable income for the private good should not decrease4. The third inequality 
4
 Note that any contribution rule that violates this assumption will create very strong disincentive 
to invest. 
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requires that if a member j's income increases, then the burden of contribution on 
other agents should not increase. 
(hi) Total contribution is weakly monotone increasing in member's income. In 
particular, ^ + J2jjn v ^ — ^ ^ h strict inequality if ^ - — 1. This assumption 
requires that the net effect of the increment in i's income on the total club good 
should not be negative. Furthermore, an increment in the income of the member that 
goes to club good in full should have strictly positive effect on total club good. 
We will call the property described in (i) anonymity, and the properties in (ii) and 
(iii) monotonicity for short. 
For notational simplicity, we will write g(W), g{u),I) or g(K,I) interchangeably, 
since there are one-to-one relationships among (K, I), (u, I) and WM. 
It is easy to verify that with a few minor additional restrictions, lump sum, linear, 
progressive, regressive and Lindahl taxes all satisfy these assumptions. We will show 
later that voluntary contribution also satisfies these assumptions. 
Given these properties, if contract i is not defaulted on, then Lender i's contribu-
tion and Borrower i's contribution are equal, 
91° = 9NL? = <?«f, W_0 = g(l + 03 - l)kh W^) 
On the other hand, if contract i is defaulted on, then Borrower % is excluded and 
Lender % contributes: 
<& = ff«i)=0(l-*i,W-i) 
Remark 1 Total contribution to the club good is weakly increasing in hi if Ii = 1 
12 
and weakly decreasing in ki if Ii = 0. 
Proof. The proof is straightforward. If Ii = 1, an increase in ki will raise the 
incomes of Lender i and Borrower i. By assumption (iii) of the contribution rule, 
^ ^ Sj^ i vfr- Therefore, G must not be decreasing in k{. On the other hand, if 
Ii = 0, an increase in ki will raise the loss of Lender i, and according to the same 
assumption, G must not increase. • 
1.3.5 Indirect Utility 
The following table summarizes the indirect utility of Lender i and Borrower i in two 
scenarios: 
Scenario 1: Loan i is not defaulted on, w^f = w^f = i + (/3 — l)ki 
Borrower i 
Lender i 
V£? = K ( G « ? , W-i, !_,)) + V2(w$? - g(w™, W^i, I)) 
VLNiD = V i ( G « f , W„i, /_0) + V a « ? - <?« f , WU /)) 
Scenario 2: Loan i is defaulted on 
Borrower i 
Lender i 
V£ti = V2(l + ki) 
Vff = ^i(G(l - fci, W-i, /_0) + V2(l -ki- g(l - h, W.i, /_,)) 
Lemma 1 Lender i's utility is strictly increasing in loan size ki when loan i is not 
defaulted on, and strictly decreasing in ki when loan i is defaulted on. Borrower i's 
utility is strictly increasing in ki. 
Proof. See Appendix l.A. • 
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Notice that the situation facing Lenders and Borrowers is similar to the Prisoner's 
Dilemma problem. The socially optimal strategies are that the Lender gives big loan 
and the Borrower does not default. However, if the loan is big, then the Borrower 
is better off defaulting on the loan. Knowing this, the Lender will not give big loan. 
Both Lender and Borrower end up with lower payoffs. 
In the following sections, we will show how coordination among the matched pairs 
of agents would reduce the severity of the bad outcomes, although such coordination 
has its own limitations (e.g., multiple equilibria) and imposes new undesirable effects 
(e.g., excessive club-good spending). 
1.4 Equilibrium 
In this section, we will establish the existence, the (non-)uniqueness and the properties 
of the equilibrium(s) of the game. We will use the sub-game perfect pure-strategy 
Nash equilibrium5. 
Definition 1 The equilibrium of the game is comprised of a vector I (k) = {Ii(k),..., In(k)} 
specifying Borrowers' default choice such that for Ii = 0, Ugf(ki, K_i, i_j) < U^^ki), 
and for Ij = 1, Ug^kjjK-j, /_,-) > U^^{kj) and a loan profile K* = (A ,^ k%, • ••,&£) 
specifying the lending level for every Lender such that k* maximizes Lenderi's utility UL,i(k*, K_i, I] 
Proposition 1 In any equilibrium, all contracts are honored. 1 = 1. 
5For a formal definition and discussion of subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium concept, see Mas-
Collel, Whinston and Green (1995) 
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Proof. By contradiction, assume that in a particular equilibrium, Borrower % 
defaults in Stage 2. By assumption, Borrower i does not default when ki = 0. There-
fore, k* > 0. In equilibrium, Lender i must correctly calculate that her loan will be 
defaulted on in Stage 2. By Lemma 1, Lender i's utility V^ is strictly decreasing in 
ki. Thus, she is better off reducing k*. This contradicts with k* being an equilibrium 
lending level. The contradiction is reached. • 
Proposition 2 In any equilibrium, all Lenders give the same amount of loan, all 
members have the same levels of income, club-good contribution and utility. 
Intuitively, the proof of Proposition 2 relies on the observation that if there are 
two different lending levels A;* < kj in an equilibrium, then Lender i can be better 
off increasing her lending to k[ = kj. By doing so, the total club good is (weakly) 
increasing, and thus the non-default utility of every other Borrower is higher, while 
their default utilities remain unchanged. Therefore, if they did not default in the 
initial lending profile, then they will not default in the new lending profile (with ki 
increased). We then show that Borrower i's non-default utility in the lending profile 
with k\ is higher than Borrower j's non-default utility with the initial profile with 
k*. Therefore, if Borrower j does not default given the initial profile with kj, then 
Borrower i will not default given the profile with increased loan k[. Hence, if Lender 
i increases k* to kj, then her loan will not be defaulted on and her income and 
utility are strictly increased. This contradicts with A;* being the equilibrium lending 
level. Therefore, it is not possible that there exist different levels of lending in any 
equilibrium. 
15 
Proof. See Appendix l.B. • 
To state succinctly the condition for non-zero equilibrium lending, we introduce 
a new concept. The contribution rule is moderate at breakdown point if for all i, 
9i (1) > 0 and Vx ( f t(l) + Zj W 1 ) ) + W - #(1)) > W ) for w = 1. This 
assumption means that at the income level 1, the contribution rule should not be so 
excessive that it makes some members worse off than not having the club good at 
all. It also means that the members have incentive to participate in the community 
voluntarily at this income level. 
Corollary 1 If the contribution rule is moderate at the breakdown point, then in any 
equilibrium, the lending level and the club-good contribution are strictly positive. 
Proof. First, we will show that in any equilibrium, G* > 0. 
By contradiction, assume that G* = 0 in an equilibrium. We can show that this 
assumption implies that in such equilibrium, there is at least one contract with non-
zero loan amount being defaulted on. (Suppose not, then wi > 1 for all I ^ i. In 
this case, the assumptions ]T) <& (1J > 0 and ^ + ] T ^ • ^ > 0 imply that G* > 0, 
which contradicts the assumption G* = 0). 
Without loss of generality, let j be one of the defaulted contracts with non-zero 
loan amount. Applying a similar line of argument in Proposition 1 to Lender j ' s max-
imization problem, we can show that she is better off reducing k*. The contradiction 
is reached. Therefore, in equilibrium, G* > 0. 
By Proposition 2, gi = g* for all i. Hence, G* = 2ng*. Combining this with the 
fact that G* > 0, we have g* > 0 as claimed in Corollary 1. 
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Now, by contradiction, assume that fcj = 0 for some i. We can show that Lender i 
can set kt > 0 small enough so that Vi(G*) + V2(l + (0- l)h) > V2{1 + h). (Indeed, 
since V2 is continuous, for any 8 > 0, we can find e(8) > 0 small enough so that 
V2(l + e(5)) - V2(l + (fi- l)e(<J)) < 6. Set 5* = Vi(G*), we know that 6* > 0, since 
G* > 0 and VX(G) > 0 for G > 0. Set k{ = e(5*) to yield V2(l+ki)-V2(l + {p-l)ki) < 
V(G*). Equivalently, V^G*) + V2(l + (fi - l)fcj) > V2(l + fe) as required). 
Notice that the above inequality is the condition for Borrower % not to default. 
Therefore, the loan ki will not be defaulted on. From Lemma 1, we know that 
Lender i is strictly better off setting ki > 0 than setting ki = 0. This contradicts 
to the assumption that ki = 0 is the equihbrium lending level for Lender i. The 
contradiction is reached. Therefore, in equilibrium, k* > 0 for all i. m 
To state the next theorem succinctly, we will call an equihbrium in which 1 > ki > 
0 for alii an interior equilibrium, and the equilibrium in which K = 1 and K = 0 
corner equilibrium. 
Theorem 1 (i) All interior equilibrium loan profiles are characterized by: 
VtfngiiK*)) + V2{w»D{k*) - 9i(K*)) = Va(w?(k*)), 
V^giiki, KU) + 2(n - 1 ) ^ , K%)) + V2{wND{h) - g_i{kh K*_,)) < V2{wD{k*)) 
for any ki > k*. 
(ii) The corner equilibrium in which K = 1 arises when V£P (K = I)> V§{k = 
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1). The corner equilibrium in which K = 0 arises when V^f > V§ for all k. 
Proof. First, recall that by Proposition 2, ki — k* for all i. On the other hand, 
Proposition 1 implies that in equilibrium, 
ug? > Ki 
The optimality of k* requires that the Lender increases ki up to the maximum level 
of ki that satisfies Ug°(K*) > Ujj^k') and Ug°(k',K*_i) > U%ti[k') for all k' > 
k*. Since Usf{k',K*_^) — Us^k') is continuous, such maximum fc, must satisfy the 
equation U%?(K*) = C/^(fc*). 
Thus, in any interior equilibrium, k* is defined by 
U™(k*,K_i = k*) = U™(k*,K_i = k*);md 
Ug°(k',K-i = k*) < U%°(k',K_i = k*) for ell k'>k*. 
Now, assume that V£tD (K = l ) > V£(k = 1). We will show that K = 1 is one 
of the equilibria of the game by showing that no agent can beneficially deviate from 
the specified strategy. Note first that no Borrower has incentive to default at k = 1, 
since by assumption, UQ^{K — 1) > U^ki = 1). Knowing this, no Lender has 
incentive to reduce the loan, since by doing so, she will strictly reduce her income 
and utility. 
Finally, assume that V^f > V% for all k. Clearly, no Lender is better off by 
setting a non-zero loan amount, since by doing so, her loan will be defaulted on with 
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certainty. • 
Theorem 2 For any contribution rule satisfying continuity, anonymity and mono-
tonicity, equilibrium exits. Multiple equilibria with rankable equilibrium payoffs arise 
when Borrowers' non-default utility as the function of equilibrium lending level inter-
sects the default utility function from above more than once. 
Proof. First, recall that by Proposition 1 and Proposition 2, in any equilibrium, 
hi = k*,Ii = 1 and gi = g{k*) for all i. Thus, for the purpose of investigating 
equilibrium lending level, we can "collapse" the domain of the non-default utility 
function Ui from 2n dimension (of KN x IN) into single dimension (of k*). That is, 
in equilibrium, Ui(K, I) = V1(2ng{k)) + V2(l + (j3 - l)k - g(k)). 
Define hND(k) = Vx{2ng{k))+V2{l + (l3-l)k-g(k)). Note that hND is continuous 
in k, since g is continuous in K, w is continuous in k, V\ is continuous in G and V2 is 
continuous in Xi. Define hD(k) = V2(l + (f3 — l)k). Note that hD is also continuous in 
k. Finally, define h(k) = hND(k) — hD(k). Note that h is a continuous function of k. 
We will show that equilibrium exists, regardless of which contribution rule being 
used. 
Case 1: hND(k) < hD(k) for all k. In this case, the unique equilibrium is K = 0. 
Case 2: / ^ ( O ) < hD(0) and hND(l) > hD(l). In this case, by Theorem 2, 
(K=1,I = 1J is one of the equilibria. Furthermore, since hND(k) — hD(k) is con-
tinuous, / ^ ( O ) - hD{0) < 0 and hND(k) - hD{k) > 0, there must exist at least one 
k* such that hND(k) - hD{k) = 0 and hND{k) > hD(k). This is also equilibrium of 
the game. 
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Case 3: hND(0) > hD(0) and hND(l) > hD{\) 
Using similar argument used in case 2, we can also show that K = 1 is one 
equilibrium of the game. However, it is possible that in this case, K = 1 is the unique 
equilibrium. 
Case 4: hND(0) > hD(0) and hND(l) < hD(l) 
In this case, there must be at least one k* such that hND(k) — hD(k) = 0 and 
hN°(k)>hD(k). 
We have shown that in all possible cases, equilibrium exists. 
If Ugf(G(k),k) and Ug^k) cross at most twice, then the equilibrium is unique. 
When these two curves cross more than twice, multiple equilibria exist. 
Note that an identical increment in all kj (j € N) would increase non-default 
payoff more than an increment in fcj. Therefore, when dUdk < ^ - , we have v^fc < 
vuD 6 _ 
Vfci • " 
6If the contribution rule is differentiable, then we have the following remark: We need to consider 
two types of derivatives with respect to k: to establish a particular equilibrium, we consider the 
partial change of Borrower i's utility with respect to the change in fcj. However, to investigate the 
existence and uniqueness of equilibria (as in Theorem 2), we need to consider the total change of the 
Borrowers' utility with respect to the identical changes in all fa. The partial derivative determines 
whether or not a fcj = k* is an equilibrium. The total derivative is neither necessary nor sufficient 
condition for equilibrium. It only helps to determine number of equilibriums. 
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As a consequence, if Vi (2n * ^(1)) + V2(wB(l) - g ( l ) ) > Vg(wB{l)), then A; = 1 
is one of the equilibria of the game. The other possible equilibria are the third, 
fifth, ..., ki satisfying U^f{k,K^ = K*) = U^{k*). If V (2n*g{l)) + V2(wB{l) -
9 (1)) < VF(WBO)), then the possible equihbria are the first, third, fifth, ..., highest 
h satisfying UgP(k, K.t = K*) = U%^k*). 
1.5 Optimal Contribution Rule 
In this section, we will introduce three new definitions: 
1. The utility profile Q = {Ui}ieM is said to weakly dominate another utility 
profile Q' = {U'^^M if Ui > U[ for all i. (Note that this bi-relation is incomplete). 
2. For a given contribution rule g, if multiple equilibria exist, then the equilibrium 
whose utility profile weakly dominates utility profiles of other equilibria is called the 
top-ranked equilibrium under contribution rule g. (If under a contribution rule g', the 
equilibrium is unique, then it is the top-ranked equilibrium of g'). 
3. A contribution rule is optimal if it satisfies the assumptions of continuity, 
anonymity and monotonicity, and the utility profile in its top-ranked equilibrium 
weakly dominates the utility profile of the top-ranked equilibrium under any other 
contribution rule. 
The optimal contribution rule can be derived by adding a Stage 0 at the beginning 
of the game, in which there is a Social Planner who sets the contribution rule in order 
to maximize a weighted sum of the utilities of all agents. 
22 
The optimal contribution rule maximizes: 
maxUND 
subject to the incentive compatibility constraints: 
U^{k\K_i = k*) = UB>,{k*) 
in which 
Jb* = min{ifc such that Ugf{k', K^ = k*) < U%f{k', K^ = k*) for all k' > k} 
Theorem 3 Any top-ranked equilibrium under any optimal contribution rule g* is 
also achievable under a linear income tax rule awi, in which a =
 1+ i^_nfe* 
Proof. Let g be an optimal contribution rule and consider the top-ranked equi-
librium under g. Prom Proposition 1 and 2, we know that ki = k*, Wi = w*, Ii = 1 
and gi = g* for all i. Consider the contribution rule a such that a = g^» • We 
will show that this simple contribution rule yields the same level of utility and can 
maintain the lending level k*. 
Indeed, for k* and g*(k*) to be the equilibrium investment and contribution profiles 
under contribution rule g*, it must be that Ugf{2ng*{k*)) = U§ti(k*). Therefore, at 
k*, U§f(2naw*) = Ug^k*) must also hold. Thus, each Borrower i is not better off 
deviating from the non-default strategy. 
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Furthermore, we can show that UND(aw',K^ = k*)) < Ug^kf) for all k' > k*. 
(Suppose that UgD(ak',K_i = k*)) > U^k') for some k' > k*, then each Lender 
i is better off increasing ki to A;', knowing that his Borrower will not default on the 
loan. This contradicts the assumption that g* is an optimal contribution rule). Given 
this, no Lender has incentive to increase her lending. This confirms that A;* is optimal 
for each Lender i under the linear contribution rule a. • 
Note that the equal payoffs of the two optimal contribution rules apply only to the 
highest level of equilibrium. In non top-ranked equilibria, they may achieve different 
utility profiles. 
Theorem 3 implies that to investigate the properties of optimal contribution rule, 
we can focus on a subset of such rules, namely the linear contribution rule a. 
The linear optimal contribution rule a maximizes 
max V1 (2na(l + (1 - 0)fc*)) + V2{{1 - a)(l + (1 - /3)fc*)) 
a 
subject to the condition that for any a, k* satisfies 
VI (2na(l + (1 - j3)k*)) + V2((l - a)(l + (1 - /3)k*)) = VJ>(1 + *:*) 
Theorem 4 The optimal contribution rule taking into account the enforcement effect 
of the club good specifies higher contribution level than Pareto optimal level in the case 
of perfect enforcement. 
Proof. First, notice that without enforcement problem, the optimal tax can be 
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derived from the first-order condition of the above maximization problem neglecting 
the constraint and the effect of a on k* and w*. That is, 2nV{ — V2' = 0. This condition 
is identical to Samuelson first-order condition for efficient public good allocation: The 
total of the marginal rates of substitution between the public good and the private 
good should be equal to the marginal rate of transformation between the public good 
and the private good. When prices of the public good and the private good are equal, 
the efficient allocation should be such that 2nV{/V2' = 1. Let Guc, guc and auc 
be the optimal total club good, members' public contribution and tax rate in case of 
perfect enforcement, respectively. 
Now, in our constrained optimization problem stated above, the Lagrangian is: 
Vx (2na(l + (1 - 0)k*)) + V2((l - a)(l + (1 - 0)km))+ 
A [V, (2na(l + (1 - 0)fc*)) + V2((l - a)(l + (1 - /?)**)) - Vg{l + k*)] = 0 
(1 + A)[Vi (2na(l + (1 - /3)fc*)) + V2({1 - a)(l + (1 - 0)k*))] - XV2(1 + k*) = 0 
First-order condition for a is: 
f)k* r)k* 
(1 + \){2nV{ - Vfi[(l + (1 - f3)k*) + (1 - /*)££.] + (i _ p)2Lv*2 = o 
It is easy to show that 4^- > 0. Thus, comparing to Samuelson first-order con-
dition for efficient club-good allocation, there is an extra positive term added to the 
left-hand side of the equation. Therefore, 2nV{(a*Wi) < V2\wi — awi). In order for 
this to hold, it must be the case that G* > Guc. Since # = g* for all i, g* = G*/2n. 
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Hence, g* > guc. This implies that a* > auc. m 
1.6 Voluntary Contribution to Club Good 
In this section, we will analyze voluntary contribution as a contribution rule, based 
on the results from Bergstrom, Bloom and Varian (1986) (henceforth BBV). BBV 
presented an one-stage game in which each player i is endowed with wealth Wi and 
has the utility function Ui(xi, G),where it; is continuous and strictly increasing in Xi 
and G. Each player i simultaneously chooses how much to contribute to the public 
good Qi', & > 0, and spends the rest of the endowment on his private consumption 
Xi, Xi > 0 to maximize his utility. The Nash equilibrium in BBV model is a vector of 
contributions g*, i = l,...,n such that for each i, {x*,g*) solves 
max.v,i(xi, gi + G*^) 
s.t. Xi + gi = Wi 
9i>0 
BBV showed that if there is a single-valued demand function for the club good, 
which is a differentiable function of income, and if the marginal propensity to consume 
the club good is greater than zero and less than 1, then the Nash equilibrium of the 
contribution game exists and is unique up to the quantity of the public good provided 
7In BBV (1986) the authors derive the equilibrium voluntary contribution to the public good. 
In our model, the subgame of voluntary club good contribution in Stage 3 involves the community 
members only, and thus is equivalent to BBV's public good contribution game. 
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and the set of contributors. Furthermore, if the players' preferences are identical, 
then there is a critical level of income w* such that all players with income wt > w* 
contribute Wi — w* to the public good, while all players j with Wj < w* contribute 
nothing (gj = 0). The critical income level is determined by w* = <p(G*) — G*, in 
which G* is the equilibrium supply of the club good and (j> is the inverse demand 
function for the club good. 
Intuitively, the equilibrium in BBV (1986) can be considered a particular contri-
bution rule that specifies the contribution of the community members in Stage 3 in 
our model. 
Formally, consider the three-stage game among the players with the same char-
acteristics (i.e., endowment, utility function, production etc.) described in Section 
1.3.1. The first two stages specified in 1.3.2 remain unchanged, but in Stage 3, mem-
bers simultaneously choose how much to contribute to the club good8, and spend the 
rest on his private consumption. In other words, in the third stage, the community 
members play the game described in BBV (1986). 
Note that in our model, the players have identical preferences. It is also easy to 
verify that given the income, there is a single valued demand function for the club 
good. Assume that the marginal propensity to consume the club good is greater 
than zero and less than 1. Then, the subgame including the third stage in our model 
admits the Nash equilibrium described by BBV. 
Let gfBV(wi, W-i) denote the contribution rule described by BBV. We will show 
8In BBV (1986) the authors derive the equilibrium voluntary contribution to the public good. 
In our model, the subgame of voluntary club good contribution in Stage 3 involves the community 
members only, and thus is equivalent to BBV's public good contribution game. 
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that the voluntary contribution rule described in BBV (1986) satisfies our assumptions 
on the contribution rule. 
Lemma 2 gfBV(wi, W-i) is continuous and has the following properties: 
(i) g(WM) = g{wM') ifWM is the members' income profile resulted from changing 
the names of the members in the profile WM 
W I t > 0, I * < 1 and Z% < 0 for j ± i 
(iU) I t + Hj& IS - °w i t h strict ineauality */ I t = x 
Proof. See Appendix l.C. • 
Theorem 5 If in stage 3, members contribute voluntarily to the club good, and if 
the marginal propensity to consume club good is greater than zero and less than one, 
then there is a unique Nash equilibrium in which all Lenders give the same amount 
of loan, no Borrower defaults, all the members contribute the same amount to the 
club good. The utility profile under voluntary contribution is dominated by the profile 
under optimal contribution rule. 
Proof. Prom Lemma 2, we know that in equilibrium, the voluntary contribution 
satisfies the assumptions of the contribution rule. Thus, Proposition 1, Proposition 
2, Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 all hold. Therefore, all loans are identical, and none of 
them is defaulted on. Members have the same income level, and thus contribute the 
same amount to the club good. 
Note that in Stage 3, each member i contributes to the club good up to the level 
at which his marginal utility of the club good is equal to the marginal utility of the 
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private good. In particular, V{{2ng) = V^w — g). Notice that i does not take into 
account the positive externalities of his contribution. Solving this equation to yield 
voluntary contribution as an increasing function of w. Now, in Stage 1, Lenders take 
into account the fact that by increasing A;, they can increase their incomes, and thus 
increase the voluntary contribution to the club good, and hence, can enforce more 
investments. • 
The difference between participating voluntarily in the community and contribut-
ing voluntarily to the club good is note-worthy. In the former case, although individu-
als can choose not to participate in the community, once they become members, their 
contribution to the club good is involuntary and pre-determined by given rules. In 
this case, the power of communities to make take-it-or-leave-it membership offer can 
be significant. Therefore, such power can help increase the total club-good spending. 
In the latter case, not only individuals can choose to participate in the community, 
they can also choose how much to contribute to the community. Obviously, such 
extra freedom of choice creates more severe free-riding problems. 
1.7 Conclusion 
Our paper is motivated by the observation that ancient Vietnamese communes played 
a central role in enforcing economic and social transactions. We developed a theo-
retical explanation of the enforcement power of the communities whose members 
participate voluntarily. 
We showed that by investing in club goods, communities can use the power to 
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exclude members from the club goods as a threat against potential contractual viola-
tions. Such limited community enforcement would determine how much its members 
could invest in high-return, high-default-risk industries. More club goods lead to 
stronger contract enforcement, which in turn encourages more investment, generat-
ing higher income and higher contribution to club goods. There would be multiple 
equilibria in which some communities with more efficient provision of club goods 
thrive while others are trapped in low equilibrium. 
We also showed that, due to non-rivalry nature of the club good, even the weakest 
form of coordination in club-good provision, namely, the voluntary contribution, can 
create a certain level of enforcement. Since the community enforcement is limited, 
there exists an upper bound for investment. When this constraint is binding, the 
level of investment is sub-optimal. 
The "big push" model (Murphy et. al , 1989) suggested that industrialization 
often requires big investments. However, investments in modern commerce and in-
dustrial production are easier to be encroached upon than those in agriculture. Due to 
the division of labor, investors often have limted control of their investments. There 
are many opportunities for encroaching on loan, deferred payment and financial con-
tracts. Weak governments often fail to enforce contracts effectively, making large 
investments too vulnerable to be profitable. 
Absent strong formal contract enforcement, traditional communities can be good 
starting points of the process of industrialization and capital accumulation, especially 
if they have been efficiently coordinating members in providing club goods and thus 
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can utilize such club goods to enforce contracts effectively9. Therefore, regulations 
broadening or narrowing the common property rights of communities. For example, 
collectivization, privatization or land reforms might have tremendous impacts on the 
enforcement power of the communities. Therefore, governments should be extremely 
cautious in implementing developmental policies to avoid shocks that can weaken the 
power of the communities and thus dampen the very communities they mean to help. 
9
 The economic boom of the village and township entrepreneur in China in the early 1980s is a 
good example supporting this claim. 
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Appendix l .A Proof of Lemma 1 
First, recall that WB,I and WLJ are strictly increasing in fa when contract i is not 
defaulted on, and witi is strictly decreasing with fa when contract i is defaulted on. 
Thus, to prove (i), it suffices to show that the utilities of the community members 
(i.e., Lenders and non-default Borrowers) are strictly increasing in Wi. 
Assume that Wi increases. Recall assumption (iii) on the contribution rule: 
——- + >^ —— > 0 with strict inequality when ——- = 1 
If ^ - = 0, then the assumption implies that ^ - = 0. That is, agent i's contribu-
tion to the club good is unchanged and the total contribution to the club good remains 
unaffected. Meanwhile, agent Vs disposable income, uv— git increases. Therefore, his 
utility increases. 
If ^ L = i j then |^- > 0. The total club good strictly increases, while agent i's 
disposable income is unchanged. Thus, agent i's total utility increases. 
If 1 > ^ - > 0 then the total club good weakly increases, and the disposable 
income of agent i strictly increases. Thus, his utility must strictly increase. 
Part (ii) is obvious, since Borrower i's default payoff is V^ = V^(l + fa), which is 
strictly increasing in fa. Q.E.D. 
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Appendix l . B Proof of Proposition 1 
Note that if ki = kj = k* for all i and j , then IO* = w3•, =• 1 + (/3 — 1)A;*. By the 
anonymity of the contribution rule, gi = gj. Hence, and Ui = Uj. Thus, to 
complete the proof of Proposition 1, we only need to show that ki = kj for all i and 
3-
By contradiction, assume that there exists an equilibrium in which k* ^ kj. 
Without loss of generality, assume that i = 1, j = 2 and k{ < k\. 
Prom the Lemma 2, we know that no Borrowers, including 1 and 2, default on the 
loan ( I\ = 1 for alH G N). Therefore, we know that for all I, 
vffikt, G{ki *_,, r,)) > vEM) (i-i) 
Now, we want to show that Lender 1 is better off setting k[ = k% > A;*. Denote 
w[ the Borrower i's income associated with the new loan k[. Note that w[ > w{ and 
w\ = w* for alii ^ 1. We will do this in three steps: 
Claim 1: For any Borrower I other than 1, if k\ increases and all Borrowers 
other than I do not default, then the non-default strategy is also optimal for I in this 
new subgame. 
Consider a Borrower I's choice, / ^ {1}. To simplify the notation, when /_; = 1, 
we will drop the notation / and write g{k\, K-\) or g(wit W-i) (since there exists a 
one-to-one mapping between ki and uii). 
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Borrower Vs non-default utility is: 
VSPUi = Vx{G{wl WLd) + V2(wt - g*(wl Wl,)), (1.2) 
where W_x is the income profile in which only w\ is changed to w[. 
Given that k\ increases and all borrowers rather than I choose not to default, 
Wi increases while all other agents' incomes remain unchanged. Therefore, the total 
contribution to the club good weakly increases by Remark 1. That is, G(w[, W-i) > 
G(w{,W-i). Since Vi is strictly increasing, 
Vx{G{^,W-r))>Vx{G{wl,W.x)) (1.3) 
Applying assumption (ii) on the contribution rule to I and 1 to yield ^ L < 0. 
Combining this with the fact that w[ > w{, we have gi(wi, W!_t) < gi(wi, tolj). 
Hence, 
V2(wj - g(wt, W'_t)) > V2(wt - g(w;,w*_t)) (1-4) 
Combining (1.2), (1.3) and (1.4) yields 
V?f\k[ = Vl(G(w[,W_1)) + V2(wt-g(wlWLl)) (1.5) 
> V1(G(wlW-1)) + V2(wt-g*(wt,wll)) = V^D\kt (1.6) 
34 
On the other hand, applying equilibrium condition to Borrower I yields 
vg?\K > vEMk (i-7) 
Finally, since Lender z's default income does not depend on other loans and since 
h remains unchanged, it must be that 
v£Mk = *£(*>)!*• = v£(*») (i.-8) 
Combining equations (1.5), (1.7) and (1.8) yields 
Therefore, non-default strategy is optimal for Borrower I as claimed. 
Claim 2: Given that all other agents do not default, Borrower 1 optimal strategy 
is not default. 
We will prove this claim by first showing that if I-\ = 1, then Borrower l's 
non-default utility at the loan profile (k[,K-i) is (weakly) greater than Borrower 2's 
non-default utility at the loan profile (A;J, if_i), while l's default utility at (k[, K_i) is 
equal to 2's default utility at (k$, if_i). Utilizing equilibrium condition for Borrower 
2, we can show that Borrower l's no-default utility at k' is (weakly) greater than his 
default utility at k'. 
By the assumption in the claim, I_\ = 1. Therefore, Borrower l's non-default 
utility at k[ is: 
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V^\yi = Vl{G{w'1,W^)) + V2{w'1-g{w^W^)) (1.9) 
By assumption, k[ = k2. Therefore, Borrower Vs non-default income w[ = w2. 
Replacing the term w[ in (1.9) by w2 gives: 
Vafk = Vi(G(w*2,W-i)) + V2(w*2 -g(w*2,W^)) 
Meanwhile, Borrower 2's non-default utility at k{ is: 
VB£\K = Vi (GK,W-0) + V2(w*2 -g(w*2,W_2)) (1.10) 
Note that in (1.9) and (1.10), W-i and W-2 are two income profiles that defer only 
in one element. In particular, W-2 includes u;*, whereas W-\ includes w2, w2 > w^. 
By the anonymity property of the contribution rule, we can compare g(w2, W-\) 
and g{w2, W-2) across two (incomplete) income profiles involving different agents, 
namely 1 and 2, as if such differences arise from the changes in the incomes of the 
same agents (namely, income of agent 1 increases by w2 — w\). 
By assumption (ii), we know that when Borrower Vs income increases, Borrower 
2's contribution to the club good should not be decreasing. Combining this with the 
fact that u>l < w2 gives 
9{w*2,W-y)<g(wl,W-2), 
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and hence 
V2(w*2 - g(w*2, W_x)) > V2(w*2 - g(w*, W_2)). (1.11) 
Furthermore, k[ > fc*, G is (weakly) increasing and V\ is strictly increasing. These 
facts imply that 
V1{G(vfx,W-1))ZV1(G{w\,W-.i)). (1.12) 
Combining (1.9), (1.10), (1.11) and (1.12) gives 
Vg?\k>>V™\kl. (1.13) 
On the other hand, the equilibrium condition for Borrower 2 at A;* = (kl,K_i) 
implies 
v^k ± *&(*£)• (i.i4) 
Combining (1.13) and (1.14) gives 
v£?\k>>vEM)- (i-is) 
Finally, since Vg^ depends on k[ only, 
^ ( f c i , *-i) = VftW) = *%(*&) (1.16) 
where the last equality is due to the fact that k[ = k2. Combining (1.15) and (1.16) 
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gives 
fi?k > Vs,Fk > VBM) = vSM)-
Therefore, when k[ increases to A»jj, Borrower l's no-default utility is higher than 
his default utility. Thus, if all Borrowers other than 1 do not default, then the optimal 
strategy for Borrower 1 is not to default. This completes the proof of Claim 2. 
The two steps confirm that no-default strategy profile (/ = 1) is the Nash equilib-
rium for this game. Furthermore, by Lemma 1, this profile is the unique equilibrium 
profile. 
Claim 3: Given that the unique equilibrium strategy profile in the subgame with the 
new loan profile (k[, K_i) is no-default for all I, Lender i is better off by increasing 
fcj^ = ft2 
Since Lender 1 knows with certainty that by setting k[ = k%, the loan will not be 
defaulted on, but doing so will strictly increase her income. As shown in Lemma 1, 
l's utility is strictly increasing in W\. Hence, 
VL,1(k[,K-i)>VLil(klK_1). (1.17) 
This proves the Claim 3. Notice the strict inequality in (1.17) and recall that we 
only achieve weak inequality in Claim 2. This is because in Claim 2, we compare 
the payoff of Borrower 1 in the new equilibrium with that of Borrower 2 in the old 
equilibrium. 
Claim 3 demonstrates that a Borrower can be better off by deviating from the opti-
38 
mal strategy, which contradicts to the definition of Nash equilibrium. This completes 
the proof of the Proposition. Q.E.D. 
Appendix l .C Proof of Lemma 2 
In this proof, we will use two important facts derived in BBV: 
Fact 2. There exists a real valued function F(G,C), differentiable and increasing 
in G, such that in a Nash equilibrium, F(G, C) = ^2i£C uii 
Fact 3. Let (gi) and (g^) i = 1,..., n be Nash equilibria given the wealth distribution 
(wi) and (wl), let C and C be the corresponding sets of contributing consumers, and 
let function F(G, C) be as defined in Fact 2. 
Then 
F(G',C) - F(G,C) > ^ K - 0 
Now, we will show that the equilibrium voluntary contribution in BBV admits 
continuity, anonymity and monotonicity properties. 
First, since gBBV depends on the levels of incomes only, it is clear that it satisfies 
anonymity. 
To demonstrate that gBBV is continuous and satisfies monotonicity, assume that 
income of agent i increases from Wi to w\ = w^ + e, e > 0 and small. We will show 
that in all possible cases, the following inequalities are satisfied: 
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1 > TT^ > 0 (1-18) 
V9j < 0 (1.19) 
^ 1 + V ^ > 0 (1.20) 
Note that the voluntary contribution game in Stage 3 involves the members of the 
community only, and the lenders and non-default borrowers are treated equally. 
For the initial profile of incomes W = (wi,w2, ---jWi, ...,W2n), let G* be the 
unique equilibrium level of total contribution, C* be the equilibrium set of con-
tributors, w* be the critical wealth level, and g* be individual i's equilibrium con-
tribution. Similarly, define G**, C**, g** and w** for the new profile of incomes 
W = (wx,w2,...,w'i,...,W2n). 
Case 1: i is the non-contributor before and after the income change. In this 
case, -^ = 0, gi remains unchanged, thus, does not have a large jump that violates 
continuity, gj remains unaffected, because the change in Wi will affect gj only when 
it changes the total contribution to the club good. Thus, gj does not have a large 
jump that violates continuity. Since ^ i
 = o and -^ = 0 for all j ^ i, we have 
I S + £ j * | £ = 0 as (1.20) required. 
Case 2: i is a non-contributor before but becomes a contributor after the change. 
In particular, after the income increment, i contributes w\ — w** > 0. In this case, 
his contribution increases from zero to positive, thus, ^ - > 0. 
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Now, we want to show that in this case, ^j- < 0 and ^ + Ylii+i vS" — -^ First, 
we will show that G** > G*. 
By assumption, w[ > Wi, and w'j = Wj. Thus, 
Y^H ~ wd > °-
By Fact 3, 
F ( G * * , C ) - F ( G * , C ) > ^ K - ^ ) -
lee 
Hence, 
F(G**,C)-F{G*,C)>0. 
But by Fact 2, F(G, C) is strictly increasing in G. Therefore, G** > G*. This implies 
that | £ + 2 i ? 4 . Jg . > 0. Inequality (1.20) is satisfied. 
On the other hand, by the definition of critical income level, 
W; = 4>(G)-G. 
Note that <f> is the inverse function of / , which is increasing and ^ < 1. Thus, cf> is 
increasing and | J > 1. Therefore, (j){G**) - G** > <f>{G*) -G*. Hence, w** > w*. 
Thus, when an agent's income increases so that such agent is recently included 
in the set of contributor, w** increases. We know that before the increase, i is a 
non-contributor. Hence, Wi < w*. Therefore, i has to contribute no more than the 
increment in his income: 
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0<w'i- W** < W • - W* < W • - Wi 
Thus, 0 < | j £ < 1 as (1.18) requires. 
Furthermore, since Wj is unchanged but w** increases, one of the following three 
cases must be true. If j is initially a non-contributor, then after the change, j is also 
a non-contributor. If j is initially a contributor, then after the change, j becomes a 
non-contributor. In this case, -^ < 0. If j is a contributor both before and after the 
income change. In this case, after the change, j contributes gj = Wj — w** < Wj — w*, 
which also implies that ^- < 0. 
Case 3: i is a contributor both before and after the income increment. 
Before the change, gt = Wi — w^. After the change, g\ = wl — w**. Applying similar 
arguments presented in Case 2, we can show that w** > w*, and w** — w* ^ w^ — Wi. 
The only difference is that in this case, it is possible that ^- = 1. 
To show that ^ < 0, we also use the same argument presented in Case 2 (utilizing 
the fact that the critical wealth level increases but Wj remains unchanged). Finally, 
note that since F and (f> are continuous functions of {wi}i
€
N, the critical wealth level 
w** is also a continuous function of w^ for all i. Hence, g is also a continuous function 
of Wj and Wj. Q.E.D. 
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Chapter 2 
Can Religion Mitigate Credit Rationing? 
Evidence from Vietnam 
2.1 Introduction 
Since the path-breaking work by Max Weber (1904), Protestant Ethic and the Spirit 
of Capitalism, there have been many attempts to theorize and quantify the economic 
consequences of religion. More recently, social capital literature pays special attention 
to religious participation, one of the key indicators of social capital (Putnam, 1993). 
However, so far, empirical evidence of the direct links between religion and economic 
activities (in contrast with economically relevant social activities, such as marriage, 
divorce etc.) seems to be missing (Iannaccone 1998). This "missing link" may be due 
to the fact that in highly developed and institutionalized economies, religious norms 
concerning economic activities have been replaced by modern market institutions and 
thus ceased to have economic consequences they used to have. 
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Our contribution to the economics of religion and social capital theory is twofold. 
Firstly, we formulate theoretically a channel through which religion can influence 
economic transactions, namely, via contract enforcement. Secondly, we provide an 
empirical evidence of the impact of religious affiliation on economic transactions in 
credit markets in Vietnam. 
The remainder of Chapter 2 is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents a theoret-
ical model of the lender's trade-off between insolvent default risk and misdeed default 
risk and analyzes its consequences on credit-rationing problem. In particular, Subsec-
tion 2.2.1 reviews quickly three main approaches to credit-rationing problem, namely, 
adverse selection, moral hazard and limited enforcement. We argue that combining 
the last two approaches will shed new light on the issue. Subsection 2.2.2 presents 
the setting of a sequential game between a Lender who sets credit line and interest 
rate, and a Borrower who decides whether to intentionally default on the loan and if 
not, how much effort he will exert in the project. Subsection 2.2.3 derives equilibrium 
strategies for the Lender and Borrower. Subsection 2.2.4 shows comparative statics 
results. The key insight is that increasing enforcement always reduces the severance of 
credit rationing and thus increases equilibrium loan size and interest rate. However, 
in some cases, better enforcement also increases insolvent default risk. Additionally, 
increasing enforcement may not always benefit the Lender, since it allows Borrower 
to increase interest rate without increasing the risk of misdeed default. 
Section 2.3 presents an empirical model to test our hypothesis that religious af-
filiation has important impacts on the behaviors of lenders and borrowers in credit 
markets. Subsection 2.3.1 argues that if religious affiliation increases enforcement, 
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then religious households should be able to pay higher interest rates to borrow more. 
Subsection 2.3.2 provides a brief review of related literature. Subsections 2.3.3, 2.3.4 
and 2.3.5 explain the dataset and main variables used in the rest of the paper. Subsec-
tion 2.3.6 provides descriptive analysis, which gives the first indication of the relevance 
of religious affiliation in studying borrower's behavior in credit markets. Subsection 
2.3.7 explains the specification of the models and empirical strategies. Subsection 
2.3.8 focuses on the question whether religions influence borrower's perception and 
behavior, namely the loan size, interest rate and default rate. 
2.2 A Model of Insolvent Default vs. Misdeed De-
fault 
This section presents a game between a lender and a borrower and demonstrates 
the trade-off between the insolvent default risk and misdeed default risk facing the 
lender. We will show that in equilibrium, the lender can always set interest rates and 
credit line to avoid misdeed default risk. Increasing enforcement always reduces the 
severance of credit rationing, and increases equilibrium loan size and interest rate. 
However, in some circumstances, it also increases insolvent default risk. We will also 
show that increasing enforcement may not always benefit the lender, since it allows 
the borrower to charge a higher interest rate without increasing the risk of misdeed 
default. 
We will use the analytical results derived in Section 1 to formulate the main 
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hypothesis in Section 2 that religious affiliation increases contract enforcement. 
2.2.1 Motivation and Related Literature 
A Quick Look at Credit-Rationing Problem 
Credit rationing describes the situation in which a lender limits the supply of the 
loan even when potential borrowers are willing to pay a higher interest rate to borrow 
more. There are three main theoretical approaches to explain the credit-rationing 
phenomenon. The first approach (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) focuses on adverse selec-
tion of the borrowers who have limited liability on the loan. In particular, lender may 
not be able to identify the riskiness associating with each borrowers. High interest 
rate induces only high-risk borrowers to apply for the loan. Thus, the interest rate 
must be set low enough so that both high-risk and low-risk borrowers will apply for 
the loans (the case of pooling equilibrium). 
The second approach focuses on the moral hazard problem of the borrower who 
borrows to invest in a risky project. The lender may not be able to observe or contract 
on the borrower's effort that affects the chance the project will succeed. The higher 
the interest rate, the less effort the borrower will exert. Therefore, increasing the 
interest rate beyond some threshold will reduce the lender's profit. The borrower 
would not be able to borrow more, even if he is willing to pay a higher interest rate. 
The third approach focuses on the limited enforcement of the lending contract. In 
particular, the borrower can refuse to repay the loan (intentionally default) even if he 
has the means to do so. Giving too much loan will increase the borrower's incentive to 
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intentionally default. Hence, the lender is not willing to lend more than a particular 
amount, even if the borrower is willing to pay a higher interest rate to borrow more. 
A typical way to overcome this type of credit rationing is to require a collateral for 
the loan. However, as long as the value of the collateral is less than the value of the 
loan, the credit is still rationed. 
In all three approaches, there is a fundamental trade-off between increasing the 
interest rate and/or loan value to increase the return on the loan and reducing the 
interest rate and/or loan size to reduce the default risk. 
Insolvent Default vs. Misdeed Default 
In our model, we will analyze the interaction between the moral hazard and the 
limited enforcement and its impact on the lending contracts. In particular, we will 
distinguish two types of default. We call insolvent or unintentional default the case 
in which the borrower invests in the project and exerts effort but is unable to repay 
the loan because of the project failure. In contrast, we call misdeed or intentional 
default the case in which the borrower neither exerts effort nor invests in the project 
but does not repay the loan. While the first type relates to moral hazard, the second 
type relates more closely to limited enforcement problem. 
The main motivation for the combination approach in our model is that it will 
reveal the lender's trade-off between the insolvent default risk and misdeed default 
risk. In particular, increasing the loan size increases the borrower's effort and thus 
the chance that the project succeeds (lower insolvent default risk), but doing so also 
makes intentional default more tempting for the borrower. 
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Note that the three-way differentiation of the lending contracts (i.e., high interest-
large loan-high default rate vs. low interest-small loan-low default rate) in our empir-
ical result cannot be easily explained using any of the three approaches alone. The 
screening approach could not explain interest rate differentiation, since the Lender's 
optimal strategy in case of credit rationing is to charge the same interest rate to both 
low-risk and high-risk borrowers (pooling equilibrium). Meanwhile, the moral hazard 
approach would predict that larger loan size must be associated with lower interest 
rate. Finally, the limited liability approach would predict that higher default rate 
must be associated with smaller loan size1. 
The trade-off between insolvent default and misdeed default can explain our result 
that bigger loan tends to have higher interest rate2. It also can explain the seemingly 
counter-intuitive result that religious households, although report higher default risk, 
can borrow more than non-religious households. 
2.2.2 Setting 
Consider a two-stage game between a risk-neutral Lender and a risk-neutral Borrower. 
In Stage 1, the Lender sets the credit line b (the maximum amount the Borrower can 
borrow, b > 0) and the interest rate r (r > 0) taking into account the unit cost of 
1
 Our empirical result suggests that collateral plays a limited role in enforcing the loan contracts 
in the case of Vietnam. Thus, we need to investigate other mechanisms that lenders and borrowers 
use to overcome limited enforcement problem. 
2
 Note that our theoretical model assumes that the Lender has the monopoly power to set the 
interest rate and loan size. The main argument for the relevance of the assumption in our research 
comes from the empirical results presented in the next section. In particular, we will show that 
borrowers who are under stronger enforcement have to pay higher interest rates. This means that 
a large part of the social surplus generated by better enforcement was captured by lenders. This is 
the main characteristics of the monopolistic markets. 
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the capital v, where v > 1. 
In Stage 2, the Borrower decides whether to default on the loan intentionally. If 
he chooses to do so, he will borrow the loan, not invest and refuse to pay back. If 
he chooses to honor the contract, then he will decide the amount k' he will borrow 
from the Lender, the amount k he will invest and the effort e he will exert in the 
project. The level of investment determines the payoff of the project, whereas the 
Borrower's effort determines the probability of success. Assume that there is a one-
to-one mapping between the Borrower effort e and the probability of success. 
To simplify the analysis without loss of generality, we model the effort-probability 
relationship in reverse direction. Instead of choosing effort level, the Borrower chooses 
the probability of success p, p G [0,1], taking into account the effort cost asso-
ciated with p. Assume that the effort cost function e(p) is positive for p > 0, 
strictly increasing and strictly convex in p. Furthermore, assume that limp_>i e(p) — 
oo, limp_,.o e'(p) = oo, limp_i e'(p) = 0. 
At the end of Stage 2, the outcome of the investment realizes. If the Borrower 
borrows k', invests k and exerts effort e{p) to the project, then with probability 
Pi 1 > P > 0, the project succeeds, which gives revenue ka, 1 > a > 0, to the 
Borrower. The Lender receives the principal plus interest k'(l + r). With probability 
1 — p, the project fails, and the Borrower looses — e(p). The loan is unintentionally 
defaulted on and the Lender looses — k'. 
If the Borrower borrows k' and defaults intentionally after that, then the Lender 
also looses —k'. The Borrower gets k' — c(k'), in which c(k') represents the punishment 
against the misdeed default. For simplicity, we assume that the punishment is linearly 
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related to the size of the loan defaulted on intentionally, c(fc') = c * k'. To focus on 
the case of imperfect enforcement, we assume that c < 1. 
Note that the punishment c is different from the collateral: while the collateral 
punishes the insolvent default and misdeed default indiscriminately, the punishment 
c only applies to misdeed default. Therefore, c is a better approximation for the loss 
of "social capital" or social trust and psychological costs of misdeed default. 
To summarize, the Borrower's maximization problem is: 
max7r*(p(r, 6), k, k') = {p[ka - (1 + r)k'] - e(p) + (k' - k), (1 - c)b} 
in which k' — k is the amount of the loan the Borrower borrows but does not invest 
in the project. 
2.2.3 Equilibrium Analysis 
Borrower's Maximization Problem 
First, observe that if the Borrower intends to default on the loan, then he will not 
invest any capital or effort in the project and borrow as much as he can. In this case, 
On the other hand, if the Borrower decides to invest any positive amount of capital 
on the project, he will then borrow exactly the amount he plans to invest. In this 
CcLSG, tv — rC • 
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Therefore, the Lender's maximization problem can be simplified as 
max{p[ka - (1 + r)k] - e(k), (1 - c)b} 
r,k 
subject to the lending-limit constraint k <b. For notational simplicity, define g(h) = 
et-Vih) and h(r, b) = ba-(l + r)b. 
Proposition 3 1. If the lending-limit constraint is not binding, then the Bor-
rower's optimal level of effort and investment (k*,p*) is the solution of the 
following system of equations: 
k
* = ( T T ^ 
1 + r 
p = p( (H-r) i -«a 1 - a ( l + a i-<*)) 
2. If the lending-limit constraint is binding, then k* = b andp* = g(h(r,b)) 
Proof. See Appendix 2.A. • 
Proposition 4 1. If the lending-limit constraint is not binding, then increasing 
the interest rate lowers the Borrower's effort and increases the chance the project 
will fail. However, changing the loan size does not affect the Borrower's effort 
or investment on the project. 
2. If the lending-limit constraint is binding, then increasing the interest rate and/or 
decreasing the loan size lower the Borrower's effort and increase the chance the 
project will fail. 
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Proof. Also see Appendix 2.A. • 
Borrower's profit can be rewritten as 7r*(p(r, b)) = g(h(r, b))h(r, b) — e(g(h(r, &))). 
Lender's Maximization Problem 
The Lender sets the credit line and interest rate to maximize his expected payoff 
from the loan, taking into account the unit cost of capital v and their influence on the 
Borrower's effort and his intention to default. Furthermore, the credit line b* must be 
set equal or less than the Borrower's optimal investment level, (fp^r)13". Otherwise, 
the Lender will not be able to lend all of the capital he pays for. We will call the 
excess capital that the Lender possesses but cannot lend to the Borrower idle credit. 
We will show that the Borrower is able to set interest rate r and credit fine b to 
avoid misdeed default and idle credit problems. However, in order to maximize profit, 
he may not always minimize the insolvent default risk, as long as the marginal gain 
from high interest rate can offset the marginal loss from the Borrower's effort. 
The Lender's maximization problem can be simplified as maxb<r ^(r, b) = p* (r, b) (1+ 
r)b — vb subject to the no-misdeed-default constraint ir*(p(r, b)) ^ (1 — c)b and the 
no-idle-credit constraint b < (j^:)1""-
Equivalently, 
maxll(r, b) = g(h(r, 6))(1 + r)b — vb 
b,r 
s.t. g(h(r,b))h(r,b)-e(g(h(r,b))) > (1 - c)b 
( ^ _ ) r b _ 6 > 0 . 
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For notational clarity, we will use superscript uc for the case in which no-misdeed-
default constraint is not binding, and superscript co for the case in which the no-
misdeed constraint is binding. 
Theorem 2 (i) If the no-misdeed-default constraint is not binding, then the optimal 
interest rate ruc and credit line buc are characterized by the following system of two 
equations: 
buc = (^l)ih (2.1) 
v 
r « c = ^ ) ^ ( ^ - l / (2-2) 
9 a g 
(ii) If the no-misdeed-default constraint is binding, then the optimal interest rate 
r
00
 and credit line bco are characterized by the following system of two equations: 
hco = 9{h)h - e(g(h)) 
rco _ g(l-c + v)-a(bco)a-1g 
r
 ~ g> ( 1 - 0 ) 6 " L {2A) 
Proof. See Appendix 2.B. • 
We call the equilibrium in which the no-misdeed-default constraint is binding 
credit-rationing equilibrium. In this case, although the Borrower is willing to pay 
higher interest to borrow more, the Lender chooses not to lend him, because the 
Borrower cannot credibly commit that he will not intentionally default on the loan. 
The credit rationing arises due to the lack of the commitment mechanism. 
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2.2.4 Comparative Static Analysis 
In this section, we will show how increasing punishment against misdeed defaults 
mitigates credit rationing (by increasing the interest rate and loan size), and the 
conditions in which such higher enforcement gives rise to the seemingly counter-
intuitive phenomenon of higher default rate, higher interest rate and bigger loan. In 
particular, we vary punishment level c to see how the equilibrium rate p*, equilibrium 
interest rate r* and equilibrium credit line b* differ from the initial equilibrium. 
Theorem 3 1. If credit is not rationed in the initial equilibrium, then increasing 
the enforcement level c does not affect the equilibrium interest rate or credit line. 
2. If credit is rationed in the initial equilibrium, then a gradual increment of en-
forcement level c increases the optimal interest rate and credit line until the 
no-misdeed-default constraint is no longer binding. 
Proof. See Appendix 2.C. • 
Theorem 4 Increasing enforcement lowers the Borrower's effort and increases the 
probability of the unintentional default if ghj, < ^ j ^ . 
In other words, increasing c will help increasing the loan size until the shadow 
price of the capital invested is equal to half of the shadow price of the intentionally 
defaulted loan. 
Proof. See Appendix 2.D. • 
Theorem 5 If credit is rationed in the initial equilibrium, then increasing the en-
forcement always improves the Lender's profit in the new equilibrium. 
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Proof. See Appendix 2.E. • 
Theorem 6 If credit is rationed in the initial equilibrium, then increasing the con-
tract enforcement improves the Borrower's profit only ifb* < ^ 7 . 
Proof. See Appendix 2.F. • 
Corollary 2 If credit is rationed in the initial equilibrium, and if increasing the cost 
of voluntary default increases the Borrower's effort, then it also increases the Bor-
rower's profit. However, the reverse may not necessarily be true. 
Proof. Also see Appendix 2.F. • 
To summarize, Theorem 2 and 3 in this section establish two important facts: 
(i) increasing contract enforcement always increases the equilibrium loan size and 
interest rate and (ii) increasing contract enforcement sometimes increases the chance 
of unintentional default. In Section 2, we will test these conclusions on data compiled 
from the most extensive survey on Vietnamese households. 
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2.3 Religion and Credit in Vietnam 
In this part, we will discuss the hypothesis that religious affiliation increases enforce-
ment. According to the theoretical model in Section 1, increasing contract enforce-
ment always mitigates credit rationing, and thus increases the equilibrium lending vol-
ume and interest rate. Therefore, religious households must be able to borrow more 
than non-religious households, and the interest rates applied to their loans should 
be higher than those of non-religious households. We will also construct empirical 
models and strategies to test this hypothesis. 
2.3.1 Religion as an Enforcement Mechanism 
In this section, we will argue that religious affiliation can increase contract enforce-
ment. At individual level, religious borrowers may internalize the "spiritual costs" of 
misdeed default. Almost all religions explicitly prohibit violations of property rights. 
For example, in the Bible, there is a commandment stating: "You shall not steal". 
This commandment appears in Judaism, Orthodox and Roman Catholic. Similarly, 
one of the five precepts or codes of ethics in Buddhism states that one should not 
steal. Violating property rights leads to serious negative consequences that believers 
would want to avoid. 
Religious affiliation is also a form of social capital. Indeed, according to social capi-
tal literature, one of the key indicators of social capital is to what extend people attend 
to religious activities3. A known violation in property rights may adversely affect the 
3
 There have been two approaches to measure social capital. The first approach tries to measure 
directly how much people trust each other. The second approach measures indirectly, but objectively, 
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social capital of the offender. Furthermore, religious individuals often participate in 
religion-based networks or communities. A contract violation might be informed more 
thoroughly through these communities, making secular collective punishment more 
effective. In addition, religion-based networks or communities can actively enforce 
contracts among its members and punish offenders (Chapter 1 of this dissertation 
discusses how communities enforce contracts by using the power to exclude members 
from the community club goods). 
2.3.2 Related Literature 
In the last few decades, the resurgence of Evangelical Christianity in the United 
States, of Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East, of Protestantism in Latin 
America and the return of religions in Eastern Europe revived the interest in eco-
nomics of religion. Since then, the literature has been growing steadily. However, so 
far, most studies focus on the United States (and hence, on Judeo-Christian beliefs) 
due to limited data and funding availability elsewhere. Data on religion in the United 
States have helped shedding new light on the influence of religion on economically rel-
evant social behaviors such as crime (Evans et al. 1995), suicide (Bainbridge 1989), 
drinking and drug abuse (Gruber and Hungerman, 2008) and divorce (Heaton and 
Pratt 1990). 
However, the direct link between religion and economic activities seems to be 
other dimensions of social capital, such as civic engagements. Putnam (1993) approximates social 
capital by voter turnout at referenda, newspaper readership, membership in non-profit "horizontal" 
associations etc. This approach has the advantage over the former one because the measures are 
much more reliable than subjective surveys. 
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missing (Iannaccone 1998). This "missing link" may be due to the fact that in 
highly developed and institutionalized economies, religious norms and institutions 
concerning economic activities have been replaced by modern market institutions 
and thus ceased to have economic consequences it used to have. Our paper is a direct 
contribution to economics of religion by extending its considerations to the context 
of a developing country, where direct influences of religion in economic activities may 
be found. 
Our paper also relates to social capital literature. Since the groundbreaking work 
by Putnam (1993), social capital and its ubiquitous effects have attracted attention 
from social scientists. There are important evidences showing that (i) the extent 
people participate in social activities and trust each other differ widely across re-
gions and countries; and (ii) such differences have substantial political and economic 
consequences including better institutions, bigger firms, less corruption and higher 
economic growth (see, for example, Putnam, 1993 and Fukuyama, 1995). However, 
on empirical ground, social capital theory still has a long way to go. In particular, 
it needs to come up with reliable measurement of social capital, and to identify the 
channels through which social capital can influence economic activities4. 
Credit markets are the best environment for researchers to empirically identify 
the impacts of social capital. A loan contract is an "exchange of a sum of money 
today for a promise to return money in the future" (Guiso et al., 2000). The value 
4Putnam (1993) defines social capital the "feature of social life-networks, norms, and trust- that 
enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives". Fukuyama (1995, 
1997) equates trust with social capital. However, as Guiso et. al. (2000) point out, the exact 
definition of social capital does not matter much from empirical point of view, since all of them are 
highly correlated. 
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of such promise depends significantly on trust or social capital in the society. It is 
even more so in developing countries, where formal enforcement is severely limited. 
On the other hand, literature on credit markets in developing countries finds that the 
access to credit is often limited in formal financial sector, yet flourishes in informal 
sector (especially in rural area). Due to imperfect information and limited enforce-
ment (see, for example, Hoff and Stiglitz, 1993), these two sectors coexist. Facing 
severe constraints on the formal enforcement of the loan repayment, informal credit 
markets have to rely on extensive social networks. These networks can provide better 
information on the characteristics of the borrowers. Additionally, the access to this 
network can be used as "social collateral" to the loans. 
Finally, our paper relates to a small number of empirical studies using the same 
dataset. Most closely related is Tra Pham and Lensink (2007), which investigated 
lending policies of formal, informal and semiformal lenders to Vietnamese households. 
The paper identified factors determining how different types of lenders select their 
customers. However, the role of religious affiliation was not discussed. 
In this part, we will take for granted that religious participation is a particular 
form of social capital, and ask the following specific question: How does the religious 
affiliation on household and community levels affect informal credit markets in rural 
areas in Vietnam. 
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2.3.3 Dataset 
Our dataset is drawn from the most extensive household survey on living standards 
in Vietnam, the Vietnam Living Standard Survey, conducted by Vietnam's General 
Statistical Office in 1997 and 1998 with technical assistance from the World Bank 
(henceforth, VLSS). VLSS covers four levels of data: commune/ward, village/block5, 
household and individual. At household level, VLSS covered a sample of 5999 house-
holds from 299 villages and included information on the characteristics of house-
holds, such as household expenditures and consumption; educational level of the 
household members; health, fertility and nutrition; employment and earnings; de-
mography including migration; housing and durable assets; agricultural activities; 
non-agricultural self-employment; credit and saving and general community charac-
teristics. The household surveys were conducted in two rounds. Issues considered 
"sensitive," such as lending, borrowing and saving were conducted at the end of the 
second round of the survey. 
Section 14B of the dataset covered borrowing activities of the households. Infor-
mation on the amount of indebtedness of household members to people or institu-
tions outside the household was collected. If money or goods have been borrowed, 
or borrowed and repaid by any household member in the last twelve months, then 
information on those loans was collected. Such information included the source and 
amount of loan, interest, side payments, collateral, repayment schedule and reason 
for borrowing. 
5
 Village is the smallest administrative unit in Vietnam, with population ranging from several 
hundred to several thousands. Each commune includes several villages. 
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Of the 5999 households in the survey, there were 4,526 borrowing contracts con-
ducted by 2,947 households. We drop the observations associated with the households 
whose answers are evaluated as unreliable by the interviewers. Furthermore, in our re-
gression, we exclude the loans that were made by not-for-profit institutions/programs 
such as Bank for the Poor, poverty alleviation programs, and job creation programs. 
(Since these institutions may not necessarily be profit maximizers, they may not dif-
ferentiate lenders by their riskiness the way our theoretical model predicts). We also 
drop the outliers which are the loans that have unusually high value (more than 8 
standard deviations from the mean). 
In the database, there were 4266 households (70%) whose heads practice no reli-
gion, 1094 Buddhism (18%), 462 Catholic 8%, 68 Protestant (1%), 25 Caodai (.4%), 
115 Hoahao (2%), 2 Muslim (.03%) and 7 other religions (.1%). In our regressions, 
we drop Protestant, Caodai, Hoahao and other religions that represent less than 2% 
as the numbers of observations are too small to be representative. The analysis will 
focus on the borrowing patterns of the households affiliated with two main religions, 
Buddhism and Roman Catholic, in contrast with non-religious households. 
On village/block level, the dataset included information on geographic, demo-
graphic and economic conditions of 299 villages/blocks from 156 communes/wards in 
small towns and rural areas (which in turn selected from seven geographical regions). 
For our purposes, we are interested in the dominant religion in each village. However, 
such information is not available for villages/blocks located in small towns. There-
fore, in regressions that include commune characteristics, the results apply only to 
rural areas. The resulting sample contains 3456 loans. 
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2.3.4 Dependent Variables 
This study aims at examining the influence of the religion (on household and com-
munity levels) on credit markets. In particular, we want to study whether and how 
borrowing activities differ across borrowers who practice different religions and who 
come from villages with different dominant religions. We use three variables to cap-
ture three key dimensions of the borrowing activities. 
The first variable is the monetary value of every loan borrowed by members of 
every household in the past 12 months. The second variable is the interest rate 
associated with each financial contract. The third is an ordinal variable that captures 
the borrower's subjective evaluation of the default risk of each financial contract. The 
question presented to the borrowers was, "Is there a possibility that you won't be able 
to pay back this loan, or will have difficulty paying back this loan?". The answer was 
a multiple choice, with three options: 1 means "cannot repay"; 2 means "can repay 
with difficulty"; and 3 means "can repay without difficulty". 
2.3.5 Independent Variables 
Our key independent variables, which are designed to capture the religious affilia-
tion of the borrowers, comprise of dummies for the dominant religion in the village 
the borrower fives in and dummies for the religion that the head of the borrower's 
household practices. 
In addition, we include two sets of independent variables in the regressions. The 
first set of variables represents the characteristics of each loan. The set includes 
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the maturity of the loan (MATURITY), interest rate (INTEREST), loan size 
(LOANSIZE), term of repayment (if the loan regularly repaid, then REGULARPAY = 
1), secured status (whether the loan is backed by a guarantor and/or by collateral, 
GUARANTOR and COLLATERAL, respectively) and the use of the loan (if the 
loan is used for business purposes, BUS I LOAN = 1; for housing, HOUSE LOAN = 
1, for consumption, CON SUM LOAN = 1; and other purposes, OTHERLOAN). 
The second set of variables captures general information on borrowing households. 
The set includes the number of persons in the household (HHSIZE), whether the 
household is a farming household (FARM = 1 for farming household), location 
(URBAN = 1 for urban household), various proxies for household welfare such as 
household expenditures (INCOME), household expenditures per capital (log ex-
pression), household asset value (ASSETVAL), house value (HOUSEVAL), and 
household savings (SAVING). 
Table 2.1 lists all variables in our regressions. 
2.3.6 Descriptive Statistics 
There is a relatively strong correlation between individual's religion and the dom-
inant religion in his/her village. In particular, there is a 49% chance a household 
head in a Catholic dominated village is a Catholic, while the chances are 50% for 
Protestant and 33% for Buddhist communities. The fact that most communities are 
dominated by a particular religion implies that religion influences village members 
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Variable 
default 
hhloan 
loansize 
interest 
regularpay 
guarantor 
collateral 
lendbefore 
borrowbefore 
busiloan 
consumloan 
hhsize 
income 
farm 
urban 
sex 
age 
headedu 
IndBuddhism 
IndCatholic 
VilBuddhism 
VilCatholic 
VilProtestant 
Definition 
Dummy (1/2/3) variable equals 1 if loan can't be paid; 2 if loan can be paid 
with difficulty; 3 if loan can be paid without difficulty 
Value of all loans borrowed by all household members 
Size of loan (in million VND) 
Interest rate (%/month) 
Dummy (0/1) variable =1 if loan repayment is on a regular basis 
Dummy (0/1) variable =1 if loan is backed by a guarantor 
Dummy (0/1) variable =1 if loan is secured 
Dummy (0/1) variable =1 if the borrower gave loan to the lender before 
Dummy (0/1) variable =1 if the borrower borrow from the lender before 
Dummy (0/1) variable =1 for business loans 
Dummy (0/1) variable =1 for consumption loans 
Number of household members 
Household expenditure (1000 VND/year) 
Dummy (0/1) variable =1 for famr households 
Dummy (0/1) variable =1 for urban households 
Dummy (0/1) variable =1 for male household's head 
Age of the head of the household 
Household head's Years in education 
Dummy (0/1) variable =1 if the borrower's household's head practices 
Buddhism 
Dummy (0/1) variable =1 if the borrower's household's head practices 
Catholic 
Dummy (0/1) variable =1 if the dominant religion in the borrower's village is 
Buddhism 
Dummy (0/1) variable =1 if the dominant religion in the borrower's village is 
Catholic 
Dummy (0/1) variable =1 if the dominant religion in the borrower's village is 
Protestant 
Table 2.1: Religion and Credit Contracts: Variables and Definitions 
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strongly.6 Therefore, we believe that taking into account the influence of the religion 
on community level is critical to understand overall influence of religion on social 
capital in general, and on credit market in particular. 
In this paper, we call loans given by individuals who do not belong to the borrowing 
household private loans, while loans given by institutions (private and state banks, 
governmental credit programs) public loans. In our dataset, there were 2332 private 
loans (52%), 1869 public loans (42%), and 244 loans with unspecified source (6%). In 
terms of volume, private loans, public loans account for 52% and 43% of total loan 
value, respectively. 
Average household borrowing differs widely across religions. In general, religious 
households have larger loan volume. However, the distribution of loan sources varies 
widely across lender's type and religions. Notice that religious households seem to 
have higher total value of loans and better access to public (or formal) lending than 
non-religious households. 
The descriptive statistics on contract level also reveal different patterns across re-
ligions. There is no significant difference between the interest rates of the public loans 
borrowed by religious households and non-religious households or among households 
with different religions. This suggests that institution lenders do not discriminate 
customers by religion. However, the situation is very different with the private loans. 
Except for Protestant, religious households have to pay much than non-religious ones. 
6
 Villages in Vietnam usually have a long history, with many in Red River Delta dated back 
more than a thousand years. Over generations, village members establish extensive social networks, 
norms and in many cases, the by-laws and administrative bodies of the village. Therefore, when new 
religions were introduced to Vietnamese, they tended built institutions within the village boundaries 
(for example, churches and pagodas for the village). 
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Figure 2.1: Household Total Borrowing by Lender Types, across Religions 
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1.20 
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1.45 
1.20 
2.80 
1.20 
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Hoahao 
71 
2.16 
1.20 
15J0O 
0.00 
2.48 
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4.00 
15D0 
0.00 
3.51 
46 
1.17 
1.20 
3.00 
0.15 
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Other 
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1.65 
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0.00 
3.71 
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5.00 
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1.18 
1.20 
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033 
Overall 
4193 
1.61 
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20.06 
0.00 
2.58 
2327 
157 
0.00 
20.06 
0.00 
339 
1866 
1.16 
120 
9.00 
0 00 
0.52 
Table 2.2: Interest Rate per Lender Types across Religions 
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Figure 2.2: Default Rate Across Religions 
The statistics on default rates seem to be counter-intuitive. We found that except 
for Hoahao, the default risks are higher for religious households. 
When we decompose Household Loans into Private Loans and Public Loans, the 
same pattern reappears. 
In conclusion, religious households borrow more in total, and have much better 
access to institutional lenders. The default rates of the loans of the non-religious 
households are significantly lower than that of religious ones. While the interest rates 
of loans borrowed from formal lenders do not differ significantly, the interest rates of 
loans borrowed from informal lenders are much higher for religious borrowers. 
2.3.7 Model Specification and Empirical Strategies 
We will use two types of regression models in this paper: Two-Stage Least Squares 
for regressions with LOAN SIZE and INTEREST, and Ordered Logit Model for 
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DEFAULT. 
From our theoretical model, interest rate and credit line are determined simul-
taneously by the Lender, whereas the insolvent default is the consequence of this 
combination. In other words, interest rate and credit line are the two endogenous 
variables in a system of two linear equations. In particular, 
h = 7o + 7rr» + lxi + e 
Ti = ' 0O + Obh + 6Xi + e 
where bi is the size of loan i, Ti is the interest rate associated with loan i, and Xi is 
the vector of relevant independent variables. 
The two-stage least squares procedure is required to address the simultaneous 
equation problem. In the first stage, we regress interest rate and loan size on a set 
of exogenous variables concerning the borrower's household characteristics (such as 
number of the members in the household, house value, education, age, sex and religion 
of the head of the household), and contract-specific characteristics (such as collateral, 
guarantors and term of payment). That is, we regress Tj and bi on Xi and constant 
terms to get estimated values of fi and bi. 
In the second stage, we regress bi on estimated fj and Xt and r* on bi and Xi. 
That is, 
bi = 7o + lA + iXi + e 
U = 60 + 6bl)i + 6Xi + s 
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We then use the estimated values of interest rate and credit line as independent 
variables for the regression of default. 
In the regression on default rate, we use ordered logit regression method, which 
models the cumulative logit as a linear function of independent variables. Recall that 
the dependent variable, DEFAULT can be one of the three categories, 1 for "cannot 
repay the loan," 2 for "can repay the loan with difficulty" and 3 for "can repay the 
loan without difficulty". Therefore, DEFAULT values are qualitative and rankable. 
Consider cumulative probability C^, the probability that the ith individual is in 
the j th or higher category. C^ = Pr(y, < j) = J2i=i ^(Vi = k) a n ( l Logit (Cy) = 
log(1_^ ). As the first approximation, our regression model is linear: 
Logit(Cy) = <Xj + @Xi 
There is a different intercept (cutpoint) for each level of the cumulative logit. 
However, /? does not vary by the level of the cumulative logit. The intercept a,-
indicates the probability of the odds of being equal to or less than category j for the 
baseline group (the case in which all independent variables are zero). These intercepts 
will increase over j . The coefficient /? reflects the positive effect of a one-unit increase 
in the independent variable on the log-odds of being higher than category j . When 
/3 is not indexed by j , we are assuming that the one unit increase affects the log-odds 
the same regardless of which cut-point being considered. 
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2.3.8 Empirical Results 
Table 2.3 summarizes the regression results. 
From the table, note that religious affiliation at commune level increases the loan 
size and the interest rate, and reduces default rate. Furthermore, the impact on the 
loan size is particularly strong. Ceteris paribus, being in a Buddhism or Catholic 
dominated village increases the loan size by about 64% (VND 1.8 million over the 
mean of VND 2.8 million) while increases the interest rate by 38%, (0.94% more than 
the mean of 2.48% per month. Affiliation with Buddhism at household level also 
increases loan size albeit in smaller magnitude (VND .6 million) while increases the 
interest rate in smaller magnitude (.41%). 
These observations confirm our hypothesis that religious affiliation improves con-
tract enforcement and reduces credit-rationing constraints in religious households. 
Note also that, religious affiliation at household level is found to increase the 
chance of default. Our theoretical model can explain this phenomenon. In particular, 
the loan size is determined jointly by misdeed default risk and insolvent default risk. 
If enforcement is in general extremely weak, then the misdeed default risk dominates 
the lender's lending decision. If enforcement is higher in one category of borrow-
ers, it might be that the lender no longer finds the misdeed default risk is not the 
biggest threat, and a small increment in interest rate would not induce misdeed de-
fault. Therefore, she can increase the interest rate to maximize her profit, even if the 
higher interest rate reduces the borrower's effort and leads to a higher default risk. 
However, we must be careful in interpreting this result, since the default risk is sub-
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Loan Size 
Equilibrium loan size and interest rate 
loansize_hat 
interest_hat 
Religious Affiliation 
indbuddhism 
indcatholic 
vilbuddhism 
vilcatholic 
Household Characteristics 
income 
consumloan 
age 
sex 
headedu 
farm 
hhsize 
urban98 
houseval 
Contract Characteristics 
collateral 
guarantor 
regularpay 
Constant 
Observations 
R-squared 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
-1.26 
(0.08)*" 
0.6058 
(0.1372)*" 
0.11 
(0.19) 
1.18 
(0.12)*" 
1.19 
(0.21)*" 
0.44 
(0.04)*** 
0.67 
(0.14)"* 
-0.03 
(0.00)*" 
0.81 
(0.13)*" 
-0.07 
(0.01)*" 
-0.53 
(0.12)"* 
0.48 
(0.03)*" 
-0.23 
(0.17) 
0.02 
(0.00)"* 
0.00 
(0.00) 
-1.98 
(0.18)*" 
0.07 
(0.10) 
2.52 
(0.41)*" 
3456 
0.28 
Interest Rate 
-0.80 
(0.06)*** 
0.4821 
(0.1406)"* 
0.09 
(0.22) 
0.94 
(0.13)*" 
0.94 
(0.25)*** 
0.35 
(0.07)"* 
0.53 
(0.15)"* 
-0.02 
(0.01)*" 
0.65 
(0.15)*" 
-0.06 
(0.02)*" 
-0.42 
(0.13)"* 
0.38 
(0.04)"* 
-0.19 
(0.20) 
0.02 
(0.00)*** 
0.00 
(0.00) 
-1.57 
(0.12)*" 
0.06 
(0.11) 
2.00 
(0.43)"* 
2420 
0.19 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant a 
Default 
-4.2140 
(0.7634)*" 
0.88 
(0.23)*" 
-1.65 
(0.29)*** 
-0.38 
(0.17)" 
1.06 
(0.24)*** 
1.70 
(0.33)"* 
2.64 
(0.42)*** 
-1.56 
(0.39)*** 
-0.05 
(0.01)"* 
-0.39 
(0.13)"* 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.21 
(0.11)* 
0.99 
(0.17)"* 
-1.21 
(0.19)*" 
0.11 
(0.02)"* 
8.55 
(1.67)*" 
3056 
1%. 
Table 2.3: Religion and Credit Rationing: Regression Results 
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jectively evaluated. It could be that religious borrowers tend to be more conservative 
in evaluating the risks, or they are more honest in revealing their true preference to 
the interviewers. 
There is a highly significant negative correlation between loan size and interest 
rate. Our theoretical model can be extended to incorporate heterogeneous investment 
projects to explain this relationship. In particular, the bigger the loan, the more 
tempting for the borrower to default intentionally. Therefore, interest rates must be 
lowered to increase the payoffs of not defaulting intentionally. Thus, if lenders have 
different loan size requirements, then we will observe the inverse relationship between 
interest rate and loan size in a sample. 
Note that there are independent variables that are highly significant in determin-
ing some dependent variables but are not affecting other dependent variables. For 
example, the education of the household's head (HEADEDU) does affect the loan 
size and the interest rate, but does not affect the default rate. On the contrary, having 
collateral does not affect the loan size and interest rate, but does reduce the chance 
of default. 
2.4 Conclusion 
In this paper, we presented a theoretical model of the lender's trade-off between in-
solvent default risk and misdeed default risk. We also analyzed the consequences of 
the trade-off on credit-rationing problems. The key insight of the model is the obser-
vation that increasing enforcement always reduces the severance of credit rationing, 
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and thus increases the equilibrium loan size and interest rate. However, in some cases, 
increasing enforcement also increases insolvent default risk. 
In Section 2, we presented an empirical model to test our hypothesis that religious 
affiliation has important impacts on lenders' and borrowers' behavior in credit mar-
kets. In Subsection 3.3.1, we argue that if religious affiliation increases enforcement, 
then according to our theoretical model, religious households should be able to bor-
row more, and the interest rate applied to their loan should be higher. Our empirical 
results confirm that religious affiliation does mitigate credit rationing. However, it 
sometimes increases the default rate. 
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Appendix 2. A Proof of Proposition 1 and 2 
First, we will establish an important result for the proof. 
Lemma 3 1. g'(h) = ^ ^ > 0 
9 nli(U\ _ -e '"(gW)g'W 
^- 9 Kn) ~ [e"{g(h))]2 
3. e'(g(h)) = h 
Proof. Define f(h) — e'(h) and note that 
f(h) = e"(h) 
Recall that g(h) = (e')f_1'(/i), we have g(h) = fi~^(h). Invoking the rule of the 
derivative of inverse function yields 
'<*> - ( ' [ ~ 1 I ) ' " ' ) = f i r e = * m > ° <2-5) 
This completes the proof of part 1 of the Lemma. 
From the equation (2.5), we also have 
»,M _ -e'"(9{h))g'{h) 
9 [ )
~ [e"(g(h))}2 ' 
Finally, part 3 is obvious because g(-) is the inverse function of e'(-). 
Case 1: Borrower chooses not to default intentionally: 
77 
The Lagrangian for the maximization problem is: 
L = p[ka - (1 + r)k] - e(p) + /z(6 - fc) 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for k, p and fj, are: 
^ = p K " 1 - (1 + r)] - M - 0, (2.6) 
— = fcQ - (1 + r)Jfc - e\p) = 0 and (2.7) 
op 
r\ j -
/iTT" = b-k>0,n>0 (2.8) 
a// 
Subcase 1.1: /J, = 0, the constraint is not binding. 
fc* = (T^-)^ by (2.6), and (2.9) 
1 + r. 
p* = ( e ' ) I - i ] ( ( ^ _ ) A + (i + r ) ( : ^ ) r b ) by Lemma 1 and (2.7) 1+ r 1 + r 
= (e')[_11((l + r ) ^ a ^ ( l + a ^ ) ) . (2.10) 
This completes the proof of the first part of Proposition 1. 
Note that in this case, k* does not depend on b, thus, ^ = 0. Note also that 
^ = g'h'hr. From (2.9), we have ^ < 0. Finally, recall that function g(-) is 
increasing, and hence, ^jr < 0. This completes the second part of Proposition 2. 
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Subcase 1.2: (j, > 0, the constraint is binding. Prom the definition of g(h) and 
h(r, b), we have k* = b and p* = (e')[_1](&Q - (1 + r)b) = g(h(r, b)). Note that 
hb = a 6 a - 1 - ( l + r ) > 0 f o r 6 e [ 0 > ( 7 ^ - ) ^ ] (2.11) 
1 + r 
hb < 0 f o r & e [ ( - ^ — ) ^ , o o ] . 1 + r 
This completes the proof of the first part of Proposition 2. 
Furthermore, f£ = 0. Thus, 
^ = g'hr = -g'b<0 
dp dk* 
anddb = gh"-db-
Note that hb = ak01'1 - (1 + r) > 0 for 6 < ( j f ; ) 1 ^ and ^ = 1. Thus, h6 > 0. This 
completes the proof of the second part of Proposition 2. 
Inserting p* = g(h(r, b)) to (2.7) gives 
e'(<7(Mr,fc))) = Mr,&) (2.12) 
Sufficient Conditions: Note that w"(p) = —e"(p) < 0 by convexity of e(-). Hence, 
TT(P) is concave. Therefore, any p* satisfying the first-order conditions is the global 
maximizer. 
Case 2: Borrower intentionally defaults on the loan. 
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If Tr*(p(r, b), b) < (I— c)b, or n*(p(r, b), k*(r, b)) < (1 — c)b, then the Borrower will 
intentionally default, and borrow as much as he can k* = b. Q.E.D. 
Appendix 2.B Proof of Theorem 1 
Necessary Conditions: 
Lagrangian: 
L{r,b,X) = g(h(r,b))(l + r)b-vb (2.13) 
+\{g(h(r, b))h(r, b) - e(g(h(r, b))-b + cb} + j(bh - b) 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for r, b and r are: 
O r 
— (r, 6, A, 7) = g'hb(l + r)b + g{l + r)-v + \{g'hbh + ghb - eb - (1 - c)6} = 0 
—(r, 6, A, 7) = g'hr(l + r)b + gb + \{g'hTh + ghT - er} = 0 
\—(r,b,X,1) = \{g(h(r,b))h(r,b)-e(g(h(r,b))-b + cb} = 0 
^(r,b,X,7)>0 
>y(bh - b) = 0, 7 > 0, bh - b > 0 
Case 1: A = 0, No-misdeed-default constraint is not binding 
We will first solve the optimization problem without the Borrower's Optimal In-
vestment constraint, and then prove that such solution satisfies the constraint. First, 
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neglecting the constraint, the FOC with respect to r becomes 
— = g'hr(l + r)b + gb = 0 
& 6(l + r) = ^ . (2.14) 
9 
The FOC with respect to b becomes 
— .= g'hb(l + r)b + g(l + r)-v = 0 (2.15) 
& (l + r)(g'hbb + g)=v 
« (l+r)6=^L±^. (2.16) 
9 rib 
Combining (2.14) and (2.16) gives 
v-(l + r)g _ g_ 
g'h 9' 
g[hb + {l + r)} = v 
glab"'1 - (1 + r) + (1 + r)] = v 
b* = ( ^ ) i ^ , (2.17) 
which is the equation (2.1) in Theorem 1. 
In the following, we will show that when the no-misdeed-default constraint is not 
binding, the solution b* — (2a) I-° satisfies no-idle-credit constraint. 
Note that (2.15) implies that g'hbb + g — j ^ . For Lender to make positive profit, 
the interest rate Lender sets should be higher than the opportunity cost of the loan. 
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That is, 1 4- r > v. On the other hand, p(r, b) = g(h(r, b)) < 1. Therefore, it must be 
the case that g'hbb > 0. This implies that hb > 0 (as g' > 0 by Lemma 1, and b > 0 
by assumption). Therefore, it that 
b* < ( - ^ ) ^ (2.18) 
_ v l + r ; 
Lemma 3 implies that Lender is never better off lending more than the Borrower's 
optimal investment. Inserting b into (2.14) yields 
(i+r) =
 f y i~ag i~a 
r = - ^ ( - ) ^ ( - ) * - l , (2-19) 
g' a g 
This is the equation (2.2) as needed. The combination of (2.17), (2.18) and (2.19) 
completes the proof of the part (i) of Theorem 1. 
Case 2: A > 0, No-misdeed-default constraint is binding 
Note that A > 0 implies that 7 = 0, because for the no-misdeed-default constraint 
to be binding, it must be the case that the Borrower is not able to borrow up to his 
optimal level of investment. 
The FOCs become: 
g'hb{l + r)b + g{l + r)-v + \{g'hbh + ghb - eb - 1 + c} = 0, (2.20) 
g'hr(l + r)b + gb + X{g'hrh + ghr-er} = 0, (2.21) 
g(h)h - e(g(h)) -b + cb = 0. (2.22) 
dL 
db 
dL_ 
dr 
dL, 
d\ 
Note that 
Similarly, 
Thus, 
Hence, 
_ de(g(h(r,b))) 
or 
= e'(g(h(r,b)))g'(h(r,b))hr(r,b) 
= h(r,b)g'(h(r,b))hr(r,b) by (2.12) 
= hg hr. 
eb = hg'hb by (2.12) 
—- = g'hr(l + r)b +gb +\{g'hrh +ghr — hg'hr} 
or 
= g'hr{l + r)b + gb + Xghr = 0 by (2.12). (2 
= (1 + r)bg'hr + fy 
(-&)(! + r)bg' + bg 
(~b)9 
g-(l + r)bg' 
(since /ir = — b) 
(2 
Since A > 0, we have g > (1 + r)6<?'. 
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Similarly, from the equation (2.20), we have 
dL 
— = g'hb(l + r)b + g(l + r)-v + X{g'hbh + ghb-hg'hb-l + c} (2.25) 
' = g'hb(l + r)b + g(l + r)-v + \{ghb-l + c} = 0by(2.12). (2.26) 
Because the objective function is concave (i.e., derivative of the objective function is 
decreasing) and the optimal b in the constrained optimization case is less than that 
in the unconstrained optimization case, we know that: 
g'hb(\ + r)b + g(l + r)-v>0 for b*c < b*uc. 
Therefore, 
ghb-l + c<0 (2.27) 
Prom. (2.25), we have: 
A = (l + r)bg>hb + (l+r)9-v 
(1 - c) - ghb 
Combining (2.24) with (2.28) gives 
(1 + r)bg'hb + (l + r)g-v = g-(l + r)bg' 
{l-c)-ghb g 
(l-c)g-(l-c)(l + r)bg'-g2hb + (l + r)bgg'hb = (1 + r)bgg'hb + (1 + r)g2 - vg 
(l-c)g-(l-c)(l + r)bg'-g2hb = (l + r)g2-vg 
(l-c + v)g-(l-c)(l + r)bg'-g2[hb + (l + r)] = 0. 
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Inserting hb = aba 1 — (1 + r) into the above equation yields 
(1 - c + v)g - (1 - c)(l + r)bg' - aba~lg2 = 0 (2.29) 
Dividing both sides of the equation (2.29) by g gives 
(l-c + v)-(l-c)(l + r)b--aba-1g = 0 
9 
[l-c)(l + r)b- + aba-1g = (1-c + v) (2.30) 
Thus, 
g' (l-c)bc 
This is the equation (2.4) in Theorem 1 as needed. 
Now, we will derive the equation (2.3) in Theorem 1 by studying FOC for A. 
Recall that 
r\ T-
_ = G(r, b) = g(h)h - e(g(h)) - b + cb = 0. 
Hence, 
b=g{h)h-e(g(h)) 2 
1 — c 
This is the equation (2.3) as needed. 
Now, we will to show that for any given r, b* exists by showing that for any 6, we 
can find solution r* for the equation (2.30). Let H(r, b) be equal to the left-hand side 
of the equation (2.30). That is, H = (1 - c)(l + r)b^ + aba~lg. 
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Note that, for any fixed r, H = 0 for b —• 0. Furthermore, since the second term 
goes to infinity when b goes to infinity, while the first term is positive, we have H = oo 
as b —> oo. Finally, observe that H(b) is a continuous function in (0, oo). Therefore, 
the left-hand side is a continuous function in (0, oo), while the right-hand side is a 
constant. Therefore, for any b, we can find solution r* for the equation (2.30). 
Similarly, we can check that for any fixed b, we can find r such that for c,v,a in 
suitable range, the FOC is satisfied. That is, G(r, b) = g(h)h — e(g(h)) — b + cb = 0. 
Therefore, the solution for the system (2.3) and (2.4) always exists. Together with 
the equations (2.31) and (2.32), this completes the proof of the part (ii) of Theorem 
2. Q.E.D. 
Appendix 2.C Proof of Theorem 2 
Recall the FOC of Lender 's maximization problem when no-misdeed-default con-
straint is binding: 
^ = G(r, b) = g(h)h - e(g(h)) -b + cb = 0. 
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Define G(r, b) = g(h)h — e(g(h)) — b + cb = 0 and take the partial derivatives of G(-) 
with respect to r, b and c: 
QQ 
— = g'hbh + ghb - hg'hb - 1 + c 
= ghb - 1 + c 
— = p'/ir/i + 5/1,. - hg'hr 
or 
= 5^r-
Furthermore, applying Implicit Function Theorem to G(r, b) = 0 yields 
TT- = -
 nJ,* = — r - = - > 0 (since /ir = -b by Lemma 1). (2.33) 
oc oG/dr ghr g 
Hence, 
db dG/dc 
dc dG/db {\-c)-ghb 
Therefore, fc > 0 iff ghb < (1 - c), which is true by (2.27). 
(2.34) 
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Appendix 2.D Proof of Theorem 3 
Invoking f = g | H ~ | f , recalling &, % from Proposition 2 and f, g from Theorem 
2, we have 
dp 1 bg'hb 
—- = -bg - + dc g (1 - c) - 0/i6 
-
h
^\+ah \ J' (2-35) 
Combining equation (2.35) with the fact that bg' > 0 yields 
/ > 0 ^ - + — f- r < 0 
dc g ghb - (1 - c) 
2(ft»-(l-c) 
s[(<^ - (1 - c)] ~ U 
^ 2 ^ - ( l - c ) < ginc 
1 - c 
=^> <?/i& < —z— or g/if, > 1 — c 
1 — c 
<$• ghb < since ghb > 1 — c is not possible by (2.27). 
This completes the proof of Theorem 3. Q.E.D. 
Appendix 2.E Proof of Theorem 4 
The proof of Theorem 4 is rather straightforward. In particular, we want to show 
that: 
dU(r*(c),b*(c)) _ dUdr dlldb 
dc dr dc db dc ~ 
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First, recall from the Theorem 2 that J > 0 and g > 0. In addition, recall FOC 
with respect to r stated in (2.23) 
— - g'hr{l + r)b + gb + Xghr = 0 
and recall that A > 0, # > 0, hr = — b <0. Therefore, 
Q T T 
— = g'hr(l + r)b + gb>0. 
or 
Similarly, recall the FOC with respect to b stated in (2.26) 
— = g'hb{\ + r)b + g{l + r)-v + \{ghb - 1 + c} = 0 
and invoke (2.27), we have 
— = g'hb{\ + r)b + g(l + r)-v> 0. 
These facts complete the proof of Theorem 4. Q.E.D. 
Appendix 2.F Proof of Theorem 5 
Recall that Borrower's profit is 
7T = p[ba - (1 + r)b] - e(p) = g(h)h - e(g(h)). 
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we have 
d-K _ dirdr dit db 
dc dr dc db dc 
dr db 
= —[g'hrh + ghT - e'g'hr] + — [g'hbh + ghb - eg'hb} 
dr . . db . . , 
= Trghr + Trghb, since e = h. 
dc dc 
Using g; from (2.33) and g from (2.34), we have 
d-K . , 1 1 
-5- = 9"T- + ghb dc g (l-c)ghb 
ghb 
-b + {\-c)-ghb 
Thus, 
dit
 n qhb 
dc (1 — c) — ghb 
<& ghb > (1 - c)6 - #/i6 
& gh > —g—& 
1 — c 
This completes the proof of the Theorem 5. 
Note that if ^ & > 1, that is, ^ > 0, then the inequality is always satisfied. This 
completes the proof of the Corollary of the Theorem 5. Q.E.D. 
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Chapter 3 
Identifying Corruption: Distribution of 
Disaster Relief Aids in Vietnam 
"It is just as difficult to detect an official's dishonesty as it is to discover 
how much water is drunk by the swimming fish." Kautilya, Arthashastra, 
around 400 B.C. 
3.1 Introduction 
Corruption, defined as the misuse of public office for private gain, has been in the 
center of development economics and policy. Corruption is widely believed to be 
detrimental to economic growth by diverting capital, technology and human resources 
away from their socially most productive uses (Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1991, 
1993)1. Extrapolating from company and household data, the World Bank Institute 
1In particular, corruption increases the costs for establishing and running businesses, thus dis-
courages the establishment and expansion of the firms. To avoid being exploited by corrupt officials, 
businesses choose to operate in the informal economy, in smaller size and adopt less efficient "flight-
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estimated that the world's total bribe is about $1 trillion per year, or 3% of the world 
GDP (Rose-Ackerman, 2004), suggesting the enormous scale of the problem. 
However, until the last ten years, there have been very few empirical studies suc-
cessfully identifying and measuring corruption using objective data. The obstacles 
are abundant: the secretive nature and the variety in forms of corruption, the un-
willingness of the interviewees to reveal their true preferences, the poor quality of the 
financial records in developing countries etc. 
In this paper, we will establish the evidence of corruption at local governments in 
Vietnamese communes. The data set is extracted from the most extensive and infor-
mative household survey conducted in Vietnam. We will utilize unintended household 
information of the officials answering the commune survey to trace their household-
spending patterns. By connecting official data on natural disasters and government's 
relief aids (reported by the local government) with household-spending data, we will 
be able to show that there is a significant distortion of the distribution in the govern-
ment's natural relief aids toward the households whose members are the communes' 
officials. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 summarizes related liter-
ature on corruption. Section 3.3 outlines the local context of corruption in Vietnam 
and argues that natural disasters and the government's relief aids could serve as a 
by-night" technology with high degree of reversibility (Choi and Thum, 1998; Svensson, 2003). 
Institutionalized corruption distorts the industrial organization as the government establishes arti-
ficial monopolies, while firms spend resources to compete for valuable licenses and privileges rather 
than to increase productivity (Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1991). In countries in which getting a 
"right" position in the government (such as custom officials) pays off handsomely, talent is allocated 
to competing to get the position rather than to start one's own business. Corruption also affects 
the life of the citizens directly by demanding bribes and embezzling public funds for social services 
such as education, health care and insurance (Reinikka and Svensson, 2005). 
96 
"natural experiment", which allows for the evidence of the corruption of the relief 
aids to be found. Section 3.4 outlines the theoretical model and empirical strategies. 
Section 3.5 describes the data set and the key variables. Section 3.6 presents the 
empirical results. The final section discusses policy implications and directions for 
future research. 
3.2 Related Literature 
The variety in forms and the secretive nature of corruption pose a great challenge 
for economists to come up with an acceptable measure of it. There have been two 
main approaches to address this challenge: macro-level/survey data approach and 
micro-level/objective data approach. 
3.2.1 Indexing Corruption at Macro Level 
The first approach to measure corruption uses survey data at macro level (mainly 
country level) from various evaluation sources to form a ranking for countries2. Three 
important corruption indicators emerge from this approach. The first indicator, the 
Corruption Indicator, measures the political risk involved in corruption in differ-
ent countries. This indicator is compiled from the data collected by private risk-
assessment firms and published by International Country Risk Guide. The second 
indicator, the Corruption Perception Index, measures the overall extent of corruption. 
2The survey method applied in the corruption context has a severe weakness: people often under-
report or do not report corruption incidents at all. Furthermore, the corruption rankings based on 
subjective judgment do not represent the magnitude of the corruption. 
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It is based on various corruption-evaluation surveys and published by Transparency 
International. The third indicator, the Control of Corruption, combines most of cross-
country indexes that include the ranking of countries on some aspect of corruption. 
This indicator was created by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003). These three 
indicators are highly correlated. 
Empirical studies using corruption rankings have been able to point out the corre-
lations between corruption and GDP per capita, human capital, the openness of the 
economy and colonial/communist origins. However, the ranking data is too crude to 
address sophisticated questions on detecting and preventing corruption. 
3.2.2 Quantifying Corruption at Micro Level 
Rather than using survey data at macro level, the micro-level approach to measure 
corruption, which emerges only in the last ten years, utilizes the discrepancies in the 
objective data coming from different sources (for example, between the public aids 
giver and receiver) or different periods to point out the existence of corruption, and 
to quantify its magnitude at micro level. 
In a case study examining the public education funding program in Uganda, 
Reinikka and Svensson (2004a) investigated the difference between the data reported 
by the central government on its funding to the school districts with the data on actual 
receipts reported by schools that were supposedly received such funding. The authors 
found that during the period from 1991 to 1995, on average the schools received only 
13% of the government funding on the program and most schools received nothing. 
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The evidence showed that local officials captured a large amount of the funding. The 
authors later found similar situation in various sub-Saharan countries. Olken (2003, 
2004) used this method to show that 29% of the funds allocated to a road-building 
project and 18% of subsidized rice in a large antipoverty program in Indonesia were 
stolen. 
Price comparison is another useful tool to quantify the magnitude of corruption. 
The most famous example of this approach is the estimation of the extent of under-
pricing of Iraqi oil during the United Nation's Oil for Food Program, done by Hsieh 
and Moretti (2005). The authors compared the gap between the official selling price 
and various estimates of the market price of Iraqi oil during and prior to the program. 
They argued that underpricing was a way the Iraq regime utilized to obtain illegal 
kickbacks from oil buyers. The value of such kickbacks was estimated to be from $1 
to $4 billion in bribes from 1997 to 2001. 
Although the scope to which the conclusions derived from this approach can be 
applied is rather limited, it can shed new lights on the determinants of corruption at 
micro level. 
Reinikka and Svensson (2004b) successfully demonstrated the impact of infor-
mation accessibility on corruption in their case study of Ugandan education-grant 
program. In particular, they employed a two-step procedure to measure the effect of 
the government's campaign to publish the newspaper accounts of monthly transfer 
from the central government to the school districts. In the first step, they confirmed 
that distance from the schools to the nearest newspapers outlet is positively correlated 
with the knowledge of the head teachers about the program. Then, using the distance 
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as an instrument, the authors showed that better informed schools had substantial 
reduction in the shares of funds captured by corruption. 
In this paper, we will follow this emerging trend of identifying corruption at micro 
level using the discrepancies and changes in objective data. We will also test various 
hypotheses on the determinants of corruption, such as income and education of the 
population. 
3.3 Local Corruption in Vietnam 
Vietnam ranked 111th out of 163 countries in Transparency International's Corrup-
tion Perceptions Index for 2006. Although the Vietnamese government recognized 
corruption as one of the most serious threats to the survival of the regime, there are 
very few empirical studies on corruption in Vietnam. In this section, we will briefly 
describe the political and social context of the local governance and explain the rea-
son the distribution of the government's relief aids could be a useful measure of local 
corruption. 
3.3.1 Local Governance: Low Level of Transparency and Ac-
countability 
The commune3 governance in Vietnam shows very little transparency. Officially, the 
People's Committee is the administrative unit elected by the People's Council to 
3
 Commune is the smallest administrative unit in Vietnam. Each commune includes several 
villages (which are the traditional form of the communities in Vietnam). The average population 
size of the communes is 6500. 
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implement the policies proposed by the Council. In reality, the real power lies in the 
hands of the leaders of the Communist Party Organ of the commune, who often hold 
key positions in the Council, the Committee and the Commune's Police Station4. 
There is very little separation between these bodies, while the operation of the Party 
Organ is usually kept out of the public scrutiny. 
There are very few credible mechanisms to detect the embezzlement of public 
funds. Formal political opposition does not exist in the Council or the Committee. 
The media, local and national, is state-owned, and civil-society organizations barely 
exist at grass-root level. The police are also under the control of the Party Organ5. 
Meanwhile, the use of "efficiency wage" as the way to prevent corruption (Becker, 
1979) has not been in place in Vietnam. Over-staffed and obsessed with egalitarian-
ism6, the Vietnamese government has failed to keep the wage of the public servants 
above the "reservation" wage. In fact, the average wage of the public servants is no 
more than the minimum wage set to low-skill labor in the foreign-owned companies. 
(We will show in this paper that beside the "corruption windfalls", the income of the 
local officials is indistinguishable from that of the non-officials). 
In sum, the institutional arrangements and the tight public budget create a fertile 
4
 Candidates for the People's Council of the commune are nominated largely by the Party Organ. 
Understandably, the candidates are mostly Party members. Once elected, the Council members 
nominate the candidates for the People's Committee, who are also members of the Party. The 
Party Organ controls the operation of the Council and Committee in regular basis, via senior Party 
members holding the key positions in the two offices. This pattern of power centralization repeats 
at all level: district, provincial and national. 
5
 The Communist Party Organs also represent in and influence the procure system and the courts 
at all levels. 
6
 In 2006, the wages of the Vietnamese Prime Minister, the President and the Chair of the National 
Congress is about 240-250USD/month, according to Industrial Review of Vietnam, a publication of 
the Ministry of Industry of Vietnam (Hoang Du, 2006) 
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ground for corruption at local level. In the next section, we will show that the 
government's disaster-relief aids presents a "natural experiment" needed to capture 
corruption. 
3.3.2 Frequent Natural Disaster, Frequent Relief Aids 
Until recently, abundant rainfall, a dense network of rivers and an extensive irrigation 
system in Vietnam have allowed for a wide range of crops including rice and other 
cash crops. With 63% of the labor force working 7.2 million hectares in 1998 (the 
time the survey was conducted), Vietnam was one of the major exporters of rice, 
coffee, tea and cashews. 
However, Vietnam also has to cope with serious natural disasters, which could 
cause severe damages to its agriculture and aquaculture. About a dozen typhoons 
each year from May to January create extensive flooding in the lowland Mekong delta 
and threaten the flood-control levees and dams in other coastal areas. In our sample, 
the correlation between typhoon and flood is quite high (0.29). Within the two years 
the survey was conducted, one in four communes experienced a flood that had reduced 
the crop output by at least 10% while one in five communes experienced a typhoon 
that reduced the crop output by at least 10%. 
During the time this survey was conducted (from late 1997 to 1998), Vietnam 
experienced a very severe drought that caused extensive damages to rice crops and 
aquaculture. This incident is the reason for the extremely high frequency of the 
drought in our sample: within less than two years, every one in two surveyed com-
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Variable 
Flood 
Drought 
Pest 
Typhoon 
Other 
Obs 
228 
224 
227 
219 
219 
Mean 
.254386 
.5669643 
.4845815 
.1872146 
.2146119 
StADev 
.52784 
.7243229 
.6935098 
.4756656 
.4926675 
Min 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Max 
3 
4 
3 
3 
2 
Table 3.1: Number of Disasters Destroying at least 10 percent Crop 
Typhoon 
Flood 
Drought 
Pest 
Typhoon 
1 
0.2948 
0.1082 
0.3503 
Flood 
1 
0.0121 
0.3710 
Drought 
1 
0.0112 
Pest 
1 
Table 3.2: Correlations of Natural Disasters in Vietnam 
munes suffered from drought. 
Because the intense agriculture activities concentrated on a small number of crops, 
pest is chronic. Pest also tends to outbreak after a typhoon or a flood (see Table 2). 
As the result, pest is the second most frequent disaster in our survey. 
Given such high frequency of natural disasters, the natural relief aids from gov-
ernment to the affected communes is expected to be abundant. Indeed, 64% of the 
communes in the survey received some forms of government's natural relief aids such 
as cash, food, seeds and fertilizer or construction materials. 
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3.3.3 Natural Experiment: Disaster and Government Aids 
In this section, we will argue that the disaster-relief aids from the government should 
be directed to the most affected ones, and that the local officials' households are un-
likely to be affected more than regular households. We will also recall some anecdotal 
evidences. 
The government aids programs, as any disaster relief aids, will focus on alleviating 
the most affected victims. By the nature of disasters and the wide variety of the types 
of disasters included in our dataset, the chance that an official's household is affected 
by a disaster should be equal to the regular households. 
There were several anecdotal evidences of embezzlement of natural relief aids. 
After the historic flash flood in 2002, HaTinh, the province with the most damage, 
received 95 billion VND (about 7 million USD) and 2560 ton of foodstuff from central 
government. The provincial investigation agency later found out a massive embez-
zlement of aids, inflated contracts for rebuilding the infrastructure (roads, irrigation 
system etc.) (Chi Mai, 2006 and Chi Mai and Nhat Truong, 2006). Overall, only 9% 
of the relief cash was distributed to the victims. In one district, only 34 ton out of 70 
ton of rice was distributed to the victims. The rest was sold and pocketed by local 
officials. 
In 2006, another scandal of embezzlement of the government's aids in Quang Binh 
was publicized. The local officials in several communes demanded up to 70% of the 
provincial and district relief aids from the receivers to redistribute to their family 
members (Ngo Vinh, 2006). In 2007, local officials in another commune in Quang 
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Nam, a province hard hit by Xangsane tropical storm, demanded up to 90% of the 
relief aids from the victims (Phuc Lam and Viet Tuyen, 2007). 
3.4 Dataset 
Our dataset is drawn from the Vietnam Living Standard Survey (VLSS) 1998, which 
followed a similar survey conducted in 1993. VLSS 1998 was conducted by Vietnam's 
General Statistical Office from the end of 1997 to 1998, with technical assistance 
from the World Bank and funding from United Nations Development Program and 
the Swedish International Development Agency. 
The sample of VLSS 1998 was based on the VLSS 1993, which was a self-weighted 
sample drawn from all areas of Vietnam. Sample was stratified so that 20% of the 
households were from urban areas (which corresponded to the rural/urban population 
ratio of Vietnam at that time). Within each of the two strata, the list of all communes 
(around 10,000 in total) was drawn up province by province. The communes were 
then selected in the way that they were spread out evenly among all provinces in 
Vietnam. Within each commune, two villages were selected, and 16 households in 
each village were interviewed. 
Each month, VLSS covered one tenth of the sample, so the total fieldwork took 
about 12 months. VLSS was implemented at the highest standards set out by the 
World Bank's LSMS. Intensive supervision was implemented to ensure the reliability 
of the data: one supervisor for every two interviewers, one anthropometrist and one 
data entry operator. 
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VLSS 1998 covered three types of data: household questionnaire, a community 
questionnaire and a price questionnaire. At household level, VLSS 1998 covered a 
sample of 6000 households. The information included the characteristics of the house-
holds: household expenditures and consumption; educational level of the household's 
members; health, fertility and nutrition; employment and earnings; demography in-
cluding migration; housing and durable assets; agricultural activities; non-agricultural 
self-employment; and credit and saving and general community characteristics. At 
commune level, VLSS 1998 covered 150 communes in rural and minor urban areas 
with the information provided by the local government officials, village chiefs, teachers 
(for Education section), and health workers (for Health section). 
In our regressions, we drop: (i) households whose answers were judged not reliable 
by the interview team; (ii) the households with spending larger than 8 standard 
deviations; (iii) communes located in urban or minor urban areas; (iv) communes 
with missing information on public spending and budget; (v) the communes with too 
few observations included (less than 10). An explanation of the variables and the 
descriptive statistics can be found in the Table 3 and Table 4. 
3.5 Model and Empirical Strategy 
Since the higher/lower income of the officials might due to the unobservable qualities, 
we cannot estimate the effect of corruption on the official's regular income. Fortu-
nately, natural disaster aids relief served as a natural experiment. As argued above, 
Variables 
Logjihspending 
clerk 
disasterdum 
disrelief 
disreliefclerk 
log_headedu 
log_age 
log_hhsize 
Iog_workmem 
urban98 
farm 
log_housval 
north 
northcentral 
southcentral 
highland 
southeast 
mekong 
Explanation 
Log of total yearly household's per capita spending (adjusted for 
regional and monthly price index) 
Dummy variable represents whether the household has at least one 
member who is the local (commune) official. 
Dummy variable represents whether the commune was affected by 
at least 5 disasters last year, each reduces one crop at least 10%. 
Dummy variable represents whether the commune receive natural 
disaster aids within the last twelve months 
Dummy variable represents the product of clerk and disrelief 
Log of the years in school of the head of the household 
Log of the household's head's age 
Log of the number of members in the household 
Log of the number of working members in the household 
Dummy variable represents whether the commune is urban in 1998 
Dummy variable represents whether the household is involved in 
farming 
Log of the market value of the household's lodging 
Dummy variables represent which geographic region the 
household is in. 
Table 3.3: Local Corruption: Variables and Definitions 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable 
Household spending 
Commune revenue 
Commune spending 
Disaster dummy 
Disaster Relief 
House value 
Head's education 
Age 
Household size 
Work members 
Clerk 
urban98 
Farm 
North 
northcentral 
southcentral 
highland 
southeast 
mekong 
n 
3550 
3550 
3550 
3550 
3550 
3429 
3550 
3550 
3550 
3550 
3550 
3550 
3550 
3550 
3550 
3550 
3550 
3550 
3550 
Mean 
2616.49 
560.61 
450.03 
0.49 
0.62 
27.93 
6.77 
47.63 
4.76 
0.84 
0.07 
0.13 
0.71 
0.18 
0.13 
0.10 
0.08 
0.09 
0.22 
S.D. 
1534.09 
587.28 
407.62 
0.50 
0.49 
38.27 
4.12 
13.74 
1.92 
0.37 
0.26 
0.33 
0.45 
0.38 
0.34 
0.30 
0.27 
0.28 
0.41 
Min .25 Mdn .75 Max 
377.45 1678.41 2229.74 3109.73 25098.3 
0.49 224.57 384.80 673.00 3542.08 
0.38 190.79 360.66 577.97 3004.76 
0.00 8.50 16.00 30.00 600.00 
0.00 4.00 7.00 9.00 19.00 
16.00 37.00 45.00 58.00 95.00 
1.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 16.00 
Table 3.4: Local Officials, Disasters and Aids: Descriptive Statistics 
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natural disaster tends to hit everybody in the commune equally. However, only offi-
cials can embezzle the disaster-relief aid. Our model and empirical strategy will be 
developed around this key insight. 
3.5.1 Empirical Model 
In this section, we will present a simple model based on Becker-Stigler's (1979) model 
of efficiency wage and corruption to formulate the embezzlement of the disaster relief 
aid. 
Consider a population divided into different communes with the population pj, 
each with two types of agents: Officials and Members. Let Wij be Official's normal-
time income (wage) and Wkj be Members' normal-time income. 
When a disaster hits commune j , each member in this commune will suffer finan-
cial loss lj, which is arguably the same among all members of the commune (including 
Officials). 
The government provides disaster-relief aids gj > 0 to each member of the com-
mune j , which is uniform among all commune Members and Officials. 
However, when there is government aids, all Officials in commune j have an equal 
opportunity to embezzle an amount e^  from the government's disaster relief aids, with 
a risk of being exposed. 
With the probability P(ej,fj,j), Official ij (e.g., Official i in commune j) can get 
away with the embezzlement ej. The parameter /i- captures the corruption monitor-
ing process in commune j (//,• could be the distance between the commune and the 
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provincial center, or the education level of the population.) 
Case 1: Officials do not embezzle the government aid 
Member's payoff is wkj — lj + gj, whereas the Official's payoff is w^ — lj + gj 
Case 2: Officials embezzle the government aid 
If Official ij is not detected, then he will receive payoff Wij—lj+gj+ej. (To simplify 
the model, we assume that e^ is the same for all Officials within the commune). 
With the probability 1 — P(ej,fij) Official ij's embezzlement is detected, and he 
will be fired and the wage Wij will be zero. 
Therefore, Official ifs expected income who embezzles the government aids is 
P(ej,fij)(wij - lj + gj + ej) + [1 - Pfe, Vj)}(-lj + gj)- Equivalently, F(e j, Hj)(wij + 
Cj) ~ h + 9j 
The Official ij embezzles the government aids if and only if P(ej,Hj)(iVij + ej) — 
h + 9j > wij ~h+ 9j- Equivalently, ej > [wij - P(ej,fij)]/P(ej, fij) 
This is the Officials' "incentive comparability constraint" to conduct embezzle-
ment. The function P(ej,(j,j) is decreasing in ej, since the smaller the embezzlement, 
the harder it is to be detected. 
The payoff of the Members in the commune j is w^ — lj + gj — bj where bj is 
the loss per capita from the aids embezzlement imposed on the Members. We will 
simplify the model by assuming that the Officials' gain from embezzlement does not 
affect the Members' income. 
110 
3.5.2 Implications of the Model 
From the model, we derive several ways to check for the existence of aids embezzle-
ment7: 
Assumption A0: The counter-factual regular income of the Officials and Members 
in communes with disasters can be proxied by the regular income of their counterparts 
in the communes without disaster, after controlling for relevant variables8. Given this 
assumption, and after controlling for factors influencing regular income, we have: 
1. Without aids embezzlement, the difference between the incomes of the 
Members and the Officials in communes with disaster should be equal to the in-
come difference of those in the communes without disaster. If the former is larger 
than the later, then aids embezzlement is present. Mathematically, if (w^ — lj + gj + 
ej) - (wkj - lj + gj) > w^ - wkj, then ej > 0 
2. Without aids embezzlement, if the income of the Members in communes 
with disaster is less than the income of the ones in communes without disaster, then 
income of Officials in the communes with disaster should also be less than that of 
Officials in the communes without disaster. Mathematically, if w^ — lj + gj < w^, 
then Wij — lj + gj < i% . 
If, after the disaster relief, only Members are worse off while Officials are better off, 
then aids embezzlement is present. That is, ifwkj — lj+gj < w^ and Wij — lj+gj+ej > 
7
 Our empirical strategy can be viewed as an extension to the difference-in-difference method. In 
our model, we compare across four categories (regular households with disasters, regular households 
without disasters, officials' households with disasters and officials' households without disasters) in-
stead of two categories (treated and non-treated groups) as usually the case in difference-in-difference 
analysis. 
8Note that this assumption is very common among treatment-effect models. 
I l l 
Wij, then ej > 0 
3. Adding the following assumption: (Al) the disaster relief aids is always 
strictly less than the loss caused by disaster, then, after controlling for regular income, 
without aids embezzlement, the income of the Officials in the commune with disaster 
should be strictly less than that of the Officials in the commune without disaster. 
If the reverse is true, then aids embezzlement is present (the Officials become richer 
after the disaster). That is, if gj — lj < 0 and w^ — lj + gj + ej > Wij, then 6j > 0. 
Because in normal time, the higher /lower income of the officials might due to the 
unobservable qualities, we cannot estimate the effect of corruption on the official's 
normal-time income. However, natural disaster aids relief served as a natural exper-
iment. As argued above, natural disaster tends to hit everybody in the commune 
equally. However, only the officials can embezzle the disaster-relief aid. 
3.5.3 Empirical Strategy 
Let LN_HHSPEND be the natural log of household spending per capita. We take 
the log of the variable to compensate for the heteroskedasticity associated with the 
dependent variable (i.e., the consumption varies more at higher income level). Let X 
be the set of variables relevant to income (education, sex, house value, household size 
etc.). Let CLERK be a binary variable, CLERK = 1 if the household has at least 
one member who is a local official, and CLERK = 0 otherwise. Let DISASTER be a 
binary variable, DISASTER = 1 if the commune with disaster, and DISASTER = 
0 otherwise. Let DISRELIEF be a binary variable, DISRELIEF = 1 if the 
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commune the household lives in receives disaster-relief aids and DISRELIEF = 0 
otherwise. 
The first regression model, which corresponds to the claim 1 in the previous sec-
tion, is: 
LN_HHSPEND = aX + (30CLERK + ^DISASTER 
+ P2DISRELIEF + /33DISRELIEF * CLERK + e 
where f30 represents the effect of having a local official in the household on the house-
hold's income, {5X represents the effect of the disaster on the household's income, /32 
represents the effect of the disaster relief aids on the household's income and (33 rep-
resents the aids embezzlement in the case of natural-relief aid. Our key hypothesis is 
03 = 0 
The second regression model, which corresponds to Claim 2 in the previous section, 
is applied to a subset of the dataset, namely, to the households in the communes hit 
by natural disasters only. 
LN_HHSPEND\DISASTER=I = ocX + pACLERK + e 
where /34 represents the effect of having a local official in the household on the house-
hold's income in a village with disaster. Our key hypothesis is /34 = 0. 
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3.6 Empirical Results 
In this subsection, we presents three models designed to test three hypotheses pre-
sented in the previous section, to show that local officials' households receive more of 
the government relief aids. The main results are presented on the Table 5. 
Model 1 includes two regressions (1) and (2). Regression 1 confirms that overall, 
the spending of the Official's households are not higher than the average. This means 
that the efficiency wage was not implemented in Vietnam at the time. Disasters 
reduce the household spending. Furthermore, the event that the commune receives 
the government's disaster relief aids reduces the spending of all households by about 
6%. The negative sign of the DISRELIEF might be because the relief aids was 
provided to the more severely affected communes. In the survey, the severance of the 
disasters is censored (all disasters that reduced crops by more than 10% were treated 
equally). 
Regression 2 (without variable CLERK) shows that the event that the commune 
receives the government's disaster relief aids actually increases the spending of the 
official's households by 8%. This result is the evidence that the distribution of the 
relief aids is highly distorted in favor of the local officials' households. 
Model 2 includes one regression, which regresses Household Spending per Capita 
on the same set of variables but only on the communes with disasters. The regression 
results strengthen the conclusion in Model 1: overall, the officials' households are 6.3% 
better off post-disaster than the regular households. The regression does not show 
the impact of relief aids on households. This might be interpreted as the negative 
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effects of the disasters and relief aids (due to censored data) are neutralized by their 
positive effects on the officials' households. 
3.7 Conclusion 
In this paper, we established an evidence of a form of corruption: the distorted 
distribution of the government's disaster-relief aids by local officials in Vietnamese 
communes. Utilizing unintended household information of the officials answering the 
commune survey section in the Vietnam Living Standard Survey 1998, we are able 
to trace their household-spending patterns. By connecting official data on disasters 
and government's aids (reported by the local government) with household-spending 
data, we have shown a significant distortion in the distribution of the natural-relief 
aids toward the households whose members are commune officials. 
Our research is the first empirical evidence ever on corruption at the local level 
in Vietnam. The key policy insight is the need to improve the aids distribution 
monitoring. As pointed out in the paper, the efficiency wage has never been in place 
in Vietnam. Therefore, increasing the wage for local public servants could contribute 
to the battle against corruption in Vietnam. 
In future research, we may be able to identify factors influencing corruption using 
the distortion of aids distribution as one of the indicators of local corruption. 
Household Spending 
per Capita 
Clerk 
disasterdum 
Disrelief 
disreliefclerk 
ln_headedu 
ln_hhsize 
kt_workmem 
urban98 
ln_age 
Farm 
ln_houseval 
North 
northcentral 
southcentral 
highland 
All Households Included 
(1) 
0.00 
(0.994) 
-0.048 
(0.001)*** 
-0.058 
(0.002)*** 
0.081 
(0.09) * 
0.154 
(0.00)*** 
-0.538 
(0.00)*** 
0.147 
(0.00)*** 
0.130 
(0.00)*** 
0.146 
(0.00)*** 
-0.082 
(0.00)*** 
0.214 
(0.00)*** 
0.059 
(0.237) 
0.134 
(0.027)** 
0.187 
(0.004)*** 
0.240 
(0.001)*** 
MOHPI 1 
Variable Clerk Dropped 
(2) 
-0.048 
(0.001)*** 
-0.058 
(0.002)*** 
0.081 
(0.043)** 
0.154 
(0.00)*** 
-0.538 
(0.00)*** 
0.147 , 
(0.00)*** 
0.130 
(0.00)*** 
0.146 
(0.00)*** 
-0.082 
(0.00)*** 
0.214 
(0.00)*** 
0.059 
(0.234) 
0.134 
(0.026)** 
0.187 
(0.004)*** 
0.240 
(0.001)*** 
Mnrfol 2 
Disaster Affected 
Onlv 
(3) 
0.063 
(0.044)** 
-0.021 
(0.407) 
0.145 
(0.00)*** 
-0.540 
(0.00)*** 
0.168 
(0.00)*** 
0.198 
(0.00)*** 
0.125 
(0.00)*** 
-0.064 
(0.003)*** 
0.211 
(0.00)*** 
0.046 
(0.405) 
0.181 
(0.002)*** 
0.171 
(0.007)*** 
0.337 
(0.00)*** 
Table 3.5: Local Officials and Allocation of Relief Aids: Regression Results 
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